Chapter 2.
Sustaining the Mission and Its Mandate

SUMMARY
This chapter gives an overview of the main management issues that mission leaders need to be aware of in running a United Nations peace operation: integrated planning and operations based on sound peace and conflict analysis; strategic communications; crisis management; maintaining the safety and security of UN personnel; managing mission resources; and the environmental impact of a mission.
2.1 Integrated Missions

The United Nations system has the invaluable ability to employ, under a unified leadership, a mix of civilian, military and police capabilities in support of a fragile peace process. Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach to assisting countries experiencing or emerging from conflict on their path to peace and post-conflict recovery. The UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) states that the UN system should be configured in an Integrated Mission or an Integrated Approach in all conflict and post-conflict situations in which a UNCT, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or a Special Political Mission/Office is present.² A UN peace operation becomes an Integrated Mission when Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) functions are part of the peacekeeping mission. Its presence is underpinned by a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives that reflects a common understanding of the operating environment as well as agreement on how to maximize and measure the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the overall UN response.

In complex environments, the MLT should meet regularly in order to agree on overarching aims, build trust, and enhance teamwork. Furthermore, the team must develop a shared understanding of the political strategy and a “theory of change” on how to achieve the expected mission objectives and implement the mandate.

Experience has shown that integration and trust develop more easily between the leaders and staffs of the various components when key elements of a mission are co-located. If component headquarters are dispersed and contact between members of the MLT is reduced, this can undermine the mission’s effectiveness, security and level of cooperation. In addition to the maintenance of open lines of communication, the MLT can improve its shared understanding and effectiveness through the establishment of a number of integrated structures, such as a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), a Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and a Mission Support Centre. Overall, the structure of the mission should be determined by functionality rather than bureaucratic considerations. Expertise should be placed where it is most needed to improve integration and communication, which may not necessarily be within its parent component.

These two principles—a shared idea of how to implement the mission plan, and the importance of co-location—apply equally at the regional or sector levels, where it is desirable for the Civilian, Military and Police

components to be co-located wherever possible and appropriate. Humanitarian agencies often prefer to be located in separate facilities based on the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. In addition, UN police may need to position themselves adjacent to host-state police facilities.

A schematic model of an integrated UN mission is shown in Figure 2.1. It should be noted that the model is purely illustrative, since the actual structure will vary from one mission to another depending on their mandates, the resources available, the allocation of functional responsibilities to senior leaders, and the conditions on the ground. The model also illustrates the linkages between mission components, and between the mission and the wider UN system through the coordinating position of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General–Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG–RC/HC). Although Figure 2.1 depicts separate functional components, their operation in the field should be within integrated teams.

Figure 2.1 Generic United Nations integrated mission structure
All members of the MLT need to understand the roles and responsibilities of the various UN agencies, funds and programmes present in the country, and of the overarching IAP framework. The MLT should take the lead in promoting the best possible working relations between all the UN entities operating in the same country or conflict zone. This task is often the responsibility of the DSRSG–RC/HC, who has overall responsibility for coordination within the UN family. The HoM, together with the DSRSG–RC/HC, will need to strike a delicate balance between creating a secure and stable environment through the work of the mission and its military forces and police services, and preserving and respecting the “humanitarian space” for UN agencies and their partners on the ground. Given aligned overall objectives and continuous communication, these should not be regarded as conflicting priorities, but rather as a polarity that should be managed. Nonetheless, ensuring effective civil–military cooperation and coordination among elements of the wider UN and with international partners is one of the most difficult challenges that the MLT will face.

In addition to ensuring intra–UN integration, a mission will also need to ensure that there is an adequate level of targeted coordination with a wide range of relevant international, regional and host-country actors. This will require the MLT to maintain a high degree of sensitivity towards the respective mandates, interests and operating cultures of such actors. Results-oriented partnerships are the key to success, and the level of mutual interdependence will be high.

Integrated UN missions are often deployed alongside a variety of international, regional and UN Member State actors with their own mandates, agendas and time horizons. Developing fruitful and dynamic partnerships with all the relevant international presences is of the utmost importance; alignment of overall efforts is a strategic imperative.
2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations

The MLT should have a sound understanding of UN integrated planning and its interaction with mandate design processes, as well as relations between UNHQ and the field. At the same time, there will be different approaches to planning within any integrated mission, particularly between the military/police and civilian components. The MLT should encourage flexibility and agility in planning processes through close interaction and information sharing.

In addition, each UN field presence should have standing coordination arrangements that bring together the UN system in an effort to provide strategic direction to and planning oversight of the joint efforts of the Organization to build and consolidate peace in the host country. The configuration and composition of integrated or joint planning structures will vary from one mission to another, based on the scale and nature of the UN operation and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required, and in line with the principle that “form follows function”. Unless planning is driven by the MLT, the unity of purpose of the mission becomes incoherent and its mission support component (its budgetary and logistical resources) struggles to provide timely support. The buy-in and active engagement of the MLT is therefore essential for a successful and coherent planning process in support of mission implementation. At the very least, the MLT must give overarching planning direction to enable a mission planning process to be cascaded down through all components. This forms the basis of a mission plan.

Regardless of its configuration, the coordination architecture should fulfil key functions at the strategic and operational levels. Strategic planners in all UN entities should have a shared understanding of their purpose and core tasks, the composition of their teams and the organization of their work. At the mission level, Joint or Integrated Planning Units help bring together expertise across all disciplines to ensure a mission-wide planning structure and plan (see Figure 2.2).

Utilize assessment and planning tools effectively and creatively

IAP is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level that has implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires their participation. There are nine guiding principles of IAP:

1. Inclusivity. Planning must be undertaken with the full participation of the mission and the UNCT, and in consultation and coordination with UNHQ.
2. **Form follows function.** The structural configuration of the UN integrated presence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates and can therefore take different forms.

3. **Comparative advantage.** Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best equipped to carry them out and resources distributed accordingly.

4. **Flexibility based on context.** The design and implementation of assessment and planning exercises should be adapted to each situation and built on a continuing analysis of the drivers of peace and conflict and related mission options.

5. **National ownership.** This is an essential precondition for the sustainability of peace.

6. **A clear UN role in relation to other actors.**

7. **Recognition of the diversity of UN mandates and principles.**

8. **Upfront analysis of risks and benefits.**

9. **Mainstreaming.** All IAP processes should take account of UN policies on human rights, gender, and child protection, among others.

**Figure 2.2 United Nations planning frameworks**
In order to facilitate overall UN coherence, each mission should develop an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that reflects a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives and a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for achieving synergies in the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. Other UN planning frameworks, such as the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, can serve as the ISF. The purpose of an ISF is to:

• bring together the UN system around a common set of agreed peacebuilding priorities;
• identify common priorities, and prioritize and sequence agreed activities;
• facilitate a shift in priorities and/or resources, as required; and
• allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers.

The scope of the ISF should be limited to key peace consolidation priorities that are unique to the context of each mission area. Because they involve highly political and sequenced activities by a number of UN actors, many typical mandated tasks—such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); the rule of law; the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; the restoration of state authority; and addressing human rights violations—are particularly challenging and time-consuming. An ISF provides an opportunity to create clarity in the overall approach and establish priorities and a framework for mutual accountability.

Mission planners should be aware of other assessment and planning processes, and actively seek to create substantive linkages with the ISF wherever possible (see Figure 2.2). Such processes may include a Humanitarian Response Plan.

**Comprehensive Performance Assessment System**

The Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) for Peacekeeping Operations was launched in 2018 in order to give peacekeeping missions a tool with which to measure their impact. The system forms part of the Integrated Performance Assessment Framework called for in UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018) on peacekeeping performance.

CPAS is a context and mission-specific planning, monitoring and evaluation tool. It helps translate mission objectives into components and work plans. It enables the MLT to make decisions aimed at

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improving performance by maintaining or scaling up those activities that have a meaningful impact and adapting or ending those that do not. The system assesses mission performance by analysing its effect on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of the people and institutions the mission needs to influence in order to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace. It does so by analysing the relevance, extent and duration of the mission’s actions on selected outcomes, identified during the planning process.

CPAS provides the leadership team with evidence of the impact the mission is having, and an analysis of where adjustments are necessary to improve performance. This enables the leadership team to optimize the allocation of resources and direct the mission’s focus in ways that can maximize performance and continuously improve mandate implementation. The system is an iterative adaptive cycle that starts with a planning process and that ends with adjustments made to future plans and operations, based on an assessment of performance (see Figure 2.3). In large multidimensional missions the system will generate quarterly performance assessments in order to enable these missions to adapt with more agility to their fast-changing circumstances. Over time the data and analysis generated by CPAS will help inform the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and the Results-Based Budgeting reports of the missions to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

Figure 2.3 The Comprehensive Performance Assessment System
Context analysis: The drivers of peace and conflict

In recent years, there has been an increased push for data-driven peacekeeping. Conflict systems analysis constitutes a key management tool and a central point of departure for integrated planning and operations. Such analysis helps to identify the drivers of peace and conflict, and the likely areas in which intervention will be required to achieve the mission’s strategic objectives and contribute to peace and security.

In generating the analysis, the mission may make use of existing peace and conflict analyses such as the internal UN Common Country Analysis, external research or create a lighter version. For example, a workshop with a small group of national and international experts at the start of a mission or planning cycle may help identify drivers of peace and conflict. At the other end of the scale, the analysis can also be developed as a full peace and conflict monitoring system. Regardless of its scope and depth, the analysis and its identified options for action need to be an integral part of strategic and operational management throughout the planning, implementation and follow-up processes. It is a continuous process based on intelligence information, identification of and dialogue with key stakeholders, and a constant assessment of contextual changes.

Done well, context analysis can become a key part of crafting and adapting the political strategy and mission concept. It also provides a method for identifying the possible negative impacts of the mission, and ensures that the mission applies a “Do No Harm” approach.

While there are various methodologies for undertaking a peace and conflict analysis, it should as a minimum include the following four elements:

1. A situation, context or profile analysis. That is, a brief snapshot of the peace and conflict context that describes the historical, political, economic, security, sociocultural and environmental context. As a key starting point, this analysis should focus on the nature of the political settlement and its legitimacy—whether it is disputed and if so, by whom and why.

2. An analysis of the causal factors of peace and conflict. This should identify and distinguish between structural causes, intermediate or proximate causes and immediate causes or triggers. This causal analysis should attempt to establish patterns between the various

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4 This section is based on an edited version of UN DPKO, Integrated Planning and Assessment Handbook (2014), p. 26; and the draft 2018 policy.
causes of conflict and peace, perhaps by using a problem tree. The result should provide a clear idea of the key drivers of peace and conflict and allow the mission to plan to address the most important of these—that is, to reduce the effects of the drivers of conflict and strengthen the drivers of peace. In essence, this will also facilitate the prioritization and sequencing of different mission outcomes and outputs.

3. **A stakeholder or actor analysis.** Focusing on those engaged in or affected by conflict, this element analyses their interests, positions, capacities and relationships. It is essential to integrate gender and youth lenses in this analysis (see 6.2 Women’s Role in Peace and Security Promoted, and 6.3 Youth Participation Supported). In particular, the stakeholder analysis must map patterns of influence among the various actors and identify the resources that will be required to enable each actor to achieve their agenda. It is essential to map the actors that use violence to achieve their goals, as well as those that use collaborative actions to contribute to peace. The mapping exercise should also include formal and informal networks (noting that women may be more engaged in informal or community networks than official ones). This will generate an understanding of the key current and potential future actors, which will be central to formulating the mission’s political strategy towards them.

4. **A peace and conflict dynamics analysis.** This element should synthesize the resulting interactions between the peace and conflict profile, the causes and the actors, and provides potential scenarios, drivers of change and contingencies for the different scenarios. The latter will be essential for contingency planning and for ensuring the preparedness of the mission for future developments.

**Prioritization and sequencing**

In the early post-conflict period, national and international efforts should focus on achieving the most urgent and important peace-building objectives. The challenge will be to identify which activities best serve these objectives in each context. Priority setting should reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country, as identified in the peace and conflict analysis, rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply. Several operational activities will be needed to achieve an output but it is unlikely, given the limited resources available to a peace operation, that they can all be implemented at the same time. Prioritization will ensure the optimal use of available resources.
There are clear differences between prioritization and sequencing. Prioritization is a function of the importance of an activity. This does not necessarily mean that some activities must wait until a prioritized activity has been completed before they can begin. In contrast, sequencing means that one activity should not start until another has been completed. Combining the two approaches, an output can have a high priority, but could be sequenced to a later stage when the context is more conducive to change. For example, supporting a national reconciliation process may be a high priority but reconciliation initiatives can be sequenced to begin at a time when the political conditions are more favourable and national ownership is stronger.

During the planning stage, efforts should be made to both prioritize and sequence activities. The MLT should give direction on their priorities, and the planners can then provide the sequencing options. Legitimate international and national representatives of the host country should participate in these efforts. A plan of sequenced actions is based on a notional understanding of how events might unfold. Planned sequencing will almost always be disrupted by the unpredictability of activities on the ground. Prioritization and sequencing must remain flexible in order to adapt to the changing situation. Without systematic prioritization and sequencing, however, the mission will not know where it is heading or where to put its limited resources; and the influence of external factors will be even more significant and disruptive.

**Integrating a gender perspective at every stage**

Any situational analysis, as well as the ensuing planning and action, must consider all of the population and variations in living conditions, economic and political life and needs. Accordingly, a gender perspective must be an integral part of all analysis and planning. The MLT must be conscious that a UN peace operation is likely to be a critical mechanism for progressing the essential role of women in peace and security, without which the chances of a sustainable peace are small.  

Without an active gender perspective across the work of UN peace operations, missions will only see part of the overall picture related to the drivers of peace and conflict, the threat environment, the risks to civilians and the opportunities for sustainable peace. Gender expertise within the mission is essential to ensuring that peacekeeping activities are responsive to the different needs of women and men, and that resources are allocated effectively to support the WPS Agenda within the mission.

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Integrating a gender perspective is a mission-wide commitment that has to start with the MLT. A gender-responsive analysis that incorporates the needs of women and— as well as men—and considers power dynamics in society can identify indicators that serve as early-warning signs of violence or potential threats to the mission. This is particularly important for missions that have the protection of civilians as part of their mandate, as it can enhance the mission’s ability to assess threats and respond more effectively to them. Failure to undertake analysis through a gender lens can have a detrimental and long-term impact on the whole of society that could set back peace processes and future peacebuilding efforts.

**Intelligence-based decision making**

From the outset it must be clear to the MLT that intelligence in UN peace operations refers to the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet the requirements of decision making and inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate. Intelligence data can also inform the peace and conflict analysis to assist with strategic and operational decision making. In this context, it is the fundamental purpose of intelligence to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions in order to fulfil their mandates effectively and to enhance the security of all staff.

More specifically, peacekeeping intelligence is intended to support the provision of a common and coherent operational picture; provide early warning of imminent threats through good tactical intelligence; identify risks and opportunities; and contribute to force and staff protection. At the same time, peacekeeping intelligence can provide the MLT with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape that present risks or opportunities for mandate implementation.

The precise intelligence structure will vary between missions, depending on the mandate and the resources made available by TCCs. It is important that the MLT takes appropriate measures to safeguard the analytical integrity of the mission. This entails allowing the intelligence cycle to run its course and being wary of the all-too-common phenomenon of members of staff seeking influence by maintaining a monopoly on information.
UNMIL: Long-term strategic objectives versus competing operational tasks

There was broad consensus that the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) could have done more to support the host country in a number of vital areas, especially national reconciliation and constitutional reform. Critical issues such as decentralization of public services and land tenure reform could have been prioritized and followed consistently from the outset to ensure peace was sustained on the basis of social cohesion.

Addressing the structural drivers of conflict—the absence of a just social contract and human security had neither featured strongly enough nor been pursued vigorously in Liberia's post-conflict interventions. As UNMIL neared its closure, these issues remained largely unresolved. This reality exposed the odd absence of a comprehensive approach to planning for peacekeeping operations.

As a result of the government’s lukewarm attitude to the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, national reconciliation in Liberia never went beyond a set of disparate and poorly funded initiatives that failed to produce significant results. Meaningful progress on this critical issue could have been achieved by bringing a sense of “reparation” to the most war-affected areas and communities through targeted development investments.

In addition, memorialization of the victims, accompanied by a formal acknowledgement of the wrong done to them and their families, as well as a collective expression of regret and apology, could have gone a long way to bring closure to the emotional agonies experienced by thousands of Liberian families. Furthermore, adoption of critical constitutional amendments and enactment of critical draft legislation on land tenure rights and local governance could have helped address some of the deep-seated historic factors responsible for marginalization and national disharmony.

Yet, the mission’s attention and limited resources had remained thinly spread for too long across an expansive array of mandated tasks. During the transition period, the mission requested and secured a four-fold increase in its programmatic funding, which provided the badly
needed resources for implementing some of the most critical interventions through the UN Country Team, civil society and non-governmental organizations.

It is crucial for all cycles of a peacekeeping mission, but particularly in its final stage, to make use of programmatic funding for projects in support of mandate implementation. In UNMIL’s case, programmatic funding was a key enabler in residual areas of mandate focus and served as a critical tool in supporting our good offices and facilitation with the government, political parties, civil society, media, and the public.

*Farid Zarif, SRSG UNMIL, 2015–18*
Utilizing emerging technology

New technologies—including monitoring and surveillance technologies—have been made available to missions to a varying degree. The MLT should regularly request expert opinions from advisers and subject-matter experts from all three components on areas where new technology might be used to facilitate the implementation of the mission’s mandate. The use of technology is primarily aimed at supporting decision making and enhancing security. Examples of recent technologies that have been usefully deployed include situational-awareness platforms or systems (such as SAGE and MCOPS), unmanned aerial vehicles, ground radar and closed-circuit television.

In addition to technical issues that must be carefully coordinated with the host country, such as radio frequency allocation and airspace management, monitoring and surveillance technologies requires careful political management with regard to its potential intrusiveness and the sharing of information. The MLT must ensure that the mission’s use complies at all times with the principle of impartiality and is in full accordance with international and national laws. A mission must not engage in illegal activity in order to collect information.
2.3 Mainstreaming Strategic Communications

Modern communications contexts require UN peace operations to explain their strategic intention to promote changes in the behaviour of key stakeholders rather than merely disseminate information. The goals of a successful strategic communication campaign are to inform and shape a narrative that resonates with the target audience, and to promote dialogue and influence behaviour and perceptions in line with the mission’s mandate. This shift from top-down “one-way” messaging to a dialogue-driven approach through mechanisms such as social media builds engagement and partnerships, creates conversations, and allows a number of distinct but harmonized voices to come from the mission. However, such an approach requires commitment and resources.

Strategically designed and well-executed public communications are critical to a mission’s success, central to its ability to achieve the mandate and also contribute to the security of its personnel. The mission’s strategic communication plan should therefore be a key element of its political strategy. It can alter perceptions and dispel misconceptions, deter spoilers, provide greater situational awareness, solidify support, create partnerships, promote dialogue and, critically, generate political will and buy-in to a peace process. Communications also assist with maintaining consent, legitimacy and credibility, and managing local and international expectations. It is crucial that public information outreach activities, especially radio broadcasts, are able to reach the maximum number of local people, particularly women and marginalized groups, even if this may be logistically difficult or politically sensitive (for example in cases where the host government delays or obstructs the granting of a broadcast licence).

Effective internal communication (whether with UN mission personnel or the wider UN system) is also a necessary aspect of mandate implementation that is often underutilized or ignored by the UN leadership in modern peace operations. Staff at all levels use social media and have wide influence and outreach. Therefore, ensuring that UN staff understand what they are there to do and the leadership’s vision for implementing these frequently complex tasks is as vital as outreach to external constituencies.6

The planning and ownership of public information activities and processes should be driven by the MLT and fully integrated into all stages of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. The mission’s Chief of Strategic Communications and Public Information should be

considered senior staff and be part of the MLT’s decision-making process, in order to advise on communication strategies and outreach mechanisms for any decisions taken. For their part, members of the MLT should be prepared to represent their components, the mission and the UN in discussions with international, national and local media. Finally, in the spirit of “One UN”, the mission’s information and overall messages need to be closely coordinated with those of the UNCT.
2.4 Crisis Management

In peacekeeping, crisis management has become an increasingly key aspect of an MLT’s role. Crises are a regular feature of mission life. It is axiomatic that prevention through good analysis and intelligence can avoid some crises, but crises do happen. Many peace operations are on a virtually permanent crisis footing, making sound crisis-management procedures part of the normative framework for good mission leadership. Accordingly, good routine management is critical to successful mission crisis management.⁷

It is recognized that informed and effective leaders are the critical success factor in good crisis management. These leadership skills can only be developed by training and practice drills using sufficient resources in secure environments which focus on crisis preparedness. Preparedness requires clear policies and structures, clear roles and responsibilities, and understood and practised mechanisms for the fast flow of information and direction. None of these can be assumed, and it is usually too late to discover their absence in a crisis. The MLT has a central role in anticipating and preparing for crises, and ensuring all components are familiarized and practised in the use of the mission’s crisis management structures and procedures. It is equally important that all MLT members are well versed in the mission’s crisis-management procedures.

In moments of crisis, reliable reserve capacities are a vital but unmet requirement of UN peace operations. Even the best-prepared plans are ineffective in the absence of a credible response. When a political crisis erupts or serious violence breaks out, the UN must be able to react rapidly and effectively. It is critical that the mission HQ forges a unified political approach through the Crisis Management Team. While multiple initiatives will be essential, they should be mutually reinforcing. Developing contingency plans and holding regular scenario-based exercises to increase the mission’s preparedness for handling crises is essential.⁸ Because of the significantly reduced margin for error, the effectiveness of crisis response depends vitally on unity of information flow and unity of command.

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⁸ UN DPO, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ [Santos Cruz report], 19 December 2017.
UNAMID: Negotiating undeclared national caveats during crisis

There are instances when mission leadership must weigh the credibility of the mission in delivering its mandated task to protect civilians against the security of UN personnel. A critical question for mission leadership is negotiating undeclared national caveats by troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) that come up during an operation or crisis.

For example, at one point during the mandate of the United Nations—African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), fighting between rebel groups and Sudanese security forces led to approximately 50,000 people fleeing towards the UNAMID Saraf Umra Team Site. The Team Site had a Military Company, 32 Individual Police Officers and several Military Observers and civilian staff. There was a risk that the displaced persons could force their way into the camp, and a threat of further attacks on the civilians. There was also a need for inner perimeter protection to identify the actual number of people and humanitarian needs.

During MLT deliberations on how to address the situation, several tensions arose. The MLT decided to deploy an additional Military Company to the Team Site as well as a platoon of formed police unit (FPU) personnel to assist with inner perimeter protection, and crowd management.

The FPUs had not previously deployed in such situations and when the decision was made to send a detached platoon, the PCC resisted and indicated that FPU platoons could not be detached from their unit. The political implications of potentially failing to protect civilians in Saraf Umra were significant and the mission would lose trust and any credibility with the local population it was mandated to serve.
Taking into consideration the protection needs on the ground and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the PCC, the MLT decided that the FPU platoon could be deployed after all for detached duties within a specific timeframe. As part of the security arrangements the FPU personnel moved together with the Military Company to provide inner perimeter protection and crowd management, while the military focused on outer perimeter protection and the gradual return of the displaced persons.

It was important for UNAMID to have considered the implications and consequences of the situation. Several questions arose, for example regarding the interpretation of detached duties of an FPU and the MOU between the UN and the PCC, while credibly implementing the mission mandate. All this was when time for MLT decision-making was short. It was therefore important for the MLT to have a deep understanding of the competing issues and in the face of such polarities to make appropriate and timely decisions.

Brig. Gen. Hester Paneras,
Police Commissioner, UNAMID,
2013–15
2.5 Maintaining the Safety and Security of UN Personnel

The host government is primarily responsible for the security of the UN staff, their dependents and the UN resources in country. However, host-state capacity is often weak and UN field missions increasingly operate in high-risk environments. This requires a system-wide, multidimensional approach to ensure acceptable levels of staff safety and security. Security must not be looked at in isolation. Decisions need to be made in collaboration between the UN as a system and the responsible host government. A major challenge (polarity) for the MLT is to strike a balance between the mission’s accessibility and programmatic activity, while ensuring the safety and security of its personnel. Furthermore, because the UN operates an organization-wide security management system (SMS) there is potential for tension between the political and security focus and aims of the mission as articulated by its mandate and the MLT and those of the UNCT, whose focus is primarily humanitarian.

The UN Security Policy Manual contains a series of security policies that guide all actors within the UN SMS, including the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department of Safety and Security (USG UNDSS). There are four essential policies for any security decision maker in the UN system:

1. The Framework of Accountability—who is responsible for what?
2. The Applicability Policy—to whom does the SMS apply?
3. The Policy on Security Risk Management (SRM)
4. The Programme Criticality Framework

In addition to being personally responsible for the security arrangements of the mission, the HoM is often also appointed the Designated Official (DO) for all UN agencies operating in the mission area through the UN SMS. The DO chairs, and is advised by, the Security Management Team (SMT), which, in the presence of a peace operation, will contain heads of mission components (such as Military, Police and mission Support) as well as members of the UNCT. The DO is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the USG UNDSS, and is responsible for the safety and security of all designated UN personnel, premises and assets throughout the country or mission area. Nevertheless, along with other members of the MLT, the HoM should discuss with the host government and other actors in the region their respective responsibilities under international law for ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel.
The DO is advised by the Principal or Chief Security Adviser (PSA/CSA), who is the secretary to the SMT and who has authority over the UNDSS staff in the mission area. It is important for senior leaders to understand that the UN’s SMS structure works in parallel with the mission’s structure while having numerous areas of overlap. The SMT effectively analyses and responds to safety and security issues, including by providing training and advice to all components and individuals through the Chief Security Officer and Area Security Officers. It is critical that the PSA/CSA works very closely with the mission’s FC and UN Police Commissioner, as all three act as key advisors to the HoM on all security-related matters and command the mission’s Security component. Each remains accountable for the command and control of their respective entities. When joint operations are conducted, they represent a complex planning and command system that requires joint planning and coordination. This must be clearly stipulated and regulated by policies and procedures and requires specific and well-practised standard operating procedures.

The SRM process is a structured and risk-based decision-making tool. It guides the process for the identification and assessment of threats to UN personnel, assets and operations in a Designated Area. It then identifies measures and procedures to reduce the level of associated risk in order to enable programme delivery within acceptable levels of risk. The process also includes a structured decision-making model for acceptable risk, which balances security risk with programme criticality.

SRM measures should include both passive and active security, such as security risk assessments, appropriate physical protection of facilities, observance of the agreed minimum operating safety standards, an active warden system, preparatory exercises and contingency planning, as well as the provision of adequate medical facilities and personnel. SMS safety and security requirements may be in tension with the conduct of the mission’s political, operational and administrative activities, and may therefore involve difficult decisions on mission priorities.

Mission leaders need to be clear on their and their components’ responsibilities for safety and security. This is especially important when the SMS overlaps the mission’s command and control structures, such as in integrated camps where civilian staff, police and military live alongside each other in high-risk environments. Given the frequent rotation of uniformed personnel, constant crisis drills and exercises are necessary in these circumstances to ensure security procedures are well understood and function properly.
The aim of the Programme Criticality Framework is to assess programmatic priorities in changing or volatile security situations and to determine the level of acceptable security risk for programmes and mandated activities implemented by UN personnel, particularly in high-risk environments. Its application is crucial to ensure integrated security decision making in an area. The responsibility for Programme Criticality lies with the SRSG or the RC. Programme Criticality assessments are also recommended as preparatory measures in countries with unpredictable or rapidly changing security environments. Such proactive assessments can facilitate rapid decision making if the security risks are suddenly elevated.
2.6 Working with UN Headquarters

Working out how best to implement the mission mandate is an interactive process, which involves constant dialogue between the mission and UNHQ, and is informed by dialogue with key partners on the ground, in response to the evolution of the political process and the conflict. Accordingly, it is important that the MLT maintains a close relationship with relevant departments and offices in the UN Secretariat through regular consultation and sharing of information.

Following the adoption of the UN reforms in December 2017, the principal departments at UNHQ are DPO, DPPA and DOS. Other relevant entities within the UN Secretariat are UNDSS, OHCHR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It is important that the HoM establishes a personal relationship with both the Secretary-General and the USG DPO, as well as other senior officials in DPO and relevant departments and offices. Similarly, other members of the MLT should establish relationships with their counterparts in the UN Secretariat: for example, the FC with the Military Adviser, the Police Commissioner with the Police Adviser, and so on. However, it is essential that messages conveyed through these functional contacts are consistent with the thinking in the rest of the mission, that the appropriate chain of authority and command is not by-passed, and that the HoM is kept fully informed. A main point of entry for the MLT to UNHQ remains the recently modified Integrated Operational Team system, which is responsible for providing day-to-day support as well as integrated operational and political guidance to the mission.

Working through the DPO, the MLT will also need to remain mindful of the views and dynamics of the UN Security Council, budgetary committees, TCCs/PCCs and other concerned UN Member States. The HoM, and possibly also other members of the MLT, will be required to regularly brief and engage with the Security Council (and other intergovernmental bodies such as the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly) on mission progress, often in connection with the periodic renewal of the mission’s mandate, either in-person or by video conference from the field. Visits to UNHQ need to be well prepared as they provide an important opportunity to consult widely and systematically with UN counterparts and Member States.
2.7 Working with Partner Organizations

The mission operates in a political landscape in which partner organizations play a vital and even indispensable role. It falls on the MLT to ensure that relations with partner organizations are managed in such a way that enables constructive outcomes.

The MLT will also need to establish good and enduring working relationships with a range of important international and regional actors, such as diplomatic missions and bilateral donors, most notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union; countries providing non–UN military and police contingents under separate arrangements; international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; and non–governmental organizations (NGOs). The MLT should invest in these relations on a long–term basis in order to align efforts and draw on external competencies and capabilities.

There are several ways in which the MLT, and in particular the HoM, play the coordinating role of the international community at the national level. For instance, in the context of UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks the SRSG or DSRSG–RC/HC co–chairs the Joint Steering Committee with the relevant host–state minister, as well as on the thematic committees. In addition, in some cases the mission may support other ongoing political negotiations led by regional organizations.
2.8 Mission Resources

As part of the UN Secretary-General’s management reforms, the HoM has been granted greater delegation of authority (DoA). In principle, more authorities will be delegated directly from the Secretary-General to the “Head of Entity” which, in a peacekeeping operation, means the HoM/SRSG. These authorities include human resources, finance and budget, procurement, and property management (see Figure 2.4). Some can be delegated further but the HoM still retains overall authority and accountability. The HoM will clearly be advised on their delegations and the implications of these delegations, but the new system of DoA, and the accountability that goes with it, is designed to put a stronger and more transparent focus on the field and measurable results. It will have a significant impact on the business of the HoM/SRSG and the MLT.

The MLT must assess all of its proposals and plans against the human and financial resources available from the UN peacekeeping budget and other sources. While peacekeeping operations are funded through assessed contributions, programmatic aspects of the mandate, such as DDR or elections, largely depend on voluntary funding, which often falls short of the pledges made. It might be useful for the MLT to seek technical advice from World Bank representatives in priority areas where it has a clear comparative advantage.

Figure 2.4 Revised delegation of authority framework
The MLT should oversee the preparation of the mission’s budget to support successful mandate implementation. While now being given direct DoA from the Secretary General, the HoM/SRSG should understand that the mission will still have to follow the financial rules and regulations laid down by the UN General Assembly. The Director of Mission Support remains the key advisor to the MLT in this regard. Budgetary considerations need to be factored in when deciding the goals, objectives, and particularly the priorities and sequencing of competing mission activities. Plans need to consider both the assessed budget and other funds and donors that can contribute to mandate implementation.

The MLT needs to be aware that unless budgetary resources are built into the planning process and a cooperative understanding is developed for their resolution, such issues can become a major source of friction within a mission. Within the MLT, close working relations based on good coordination, cooperation, consensus and effective communication go a long way towards improving integration and ameliorating competition for limited resources.

**Staffing**

The most important resource of a mission is its personnel. Qualified, competent and dedicated personnel at all levels can make or break a mission. While the recruitment of the leadership is the responsibility of UNHQ, the MLT and in particular the HoM has authority and responsibility for the recruitment of mission staff with the required skills and integrity. Managers should ensure that vacancies are filled in a timely manner, and that staff receive the necessary training and opportunities for advancement. Maintaining high morale within the mission is also an important factor in retaining competent staff members.

Ensuring gender parity within the mission contributes to the overall effectiveness of peace operations. Ambitious targets for gender parity in missions have been set by the Secretary-General. Women in peacekeeping give missions greater scope to engage in community outreach, support more effective mandate implementation and ‘decrease incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse’.

Increasing women’s participation requires a willingness within the senior leadership not only to bolster the number of women serving in key positions, but also to ensure female interlocutors in all stages of the peace process.

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2.9 Maintaining a Green Footprint

Large and complex peace operations are now deployed to some of the world’s most insecure areas. Enabling infrastructure may be severely lacking, and this can lead to serious challenges in ensuring good environmental stewardship. The short- and long-term implications of underperformance are serious, particularly in light of the vulnerability of the ecosystems and societies to which UN operations are deployed.

As noted earlier in this chapter, part of the MLT’s responsibility is to maintain the host state’s long-term trust and confidence in the mission. The way in which the mission treats the physical environment can be seen as highly symbolic of the level of respect and consideration it has for the host state. The MLT also has a responsibility to ensure that “responsible missions achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems”, and thus have a positive impact on these wherever possible.¹⁰

While respecting all local laws and regulations, the waste generated by UN field missions must be managed and disposed of in a safe and proper manner in order to protect the health, safety and security of mission personnel and local populations, and to reduce the risk of accidents and environmental degradation. In the absence of host-country or local laws or regulations, field missions must comply with internationally recognized best practices and standards. There is ample support and guidance available to enable the MLT and its members to meet these standards.¹¹

The mission should, to the greatest extent possible, procure goods and services locally in an attempt to increase the peace dividend. If, for example, water is contaminated, or firewood is not easily accessible as a consequence of mission actions, it may also have a disproportionate impact or unintended consequences on women in society. However, the mission should be aware of and pay attention to possible local political, ethnic or religious rivalries, as an imbalanced use of local resources or employment of service providers might be perceived as bias and damage the credibility or impartiality of the mission.

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¹⁰ UN DFS, ‘DFS Environment Strategy (Executive Summary)’, April 2017.
¹¹ UN DPKO/DFS, Policy on Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions, June 2015.
MINUJUSTH: Delegation of authority

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach to assisting countries in—or emerging from—conflict on their path to peace and post-conflict recovery. However, the financial rules and regulations that govern the use of assessed resources sometimes appear to be in conflict with achieving the desired level of integration. Leadership, creativity and innovation are needed to effectively achieve mandates within the regulatory framework.

The UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) completed its peacekeeping mandate in October 2019. The UN Security Council mandated a follow-on special political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), to “work in an advisory capacity with Haitian authorities and the UN Country Team (UNCT) to further the consolidation of the stability, security, governance, rule of law, and human rights gains achieved since 2004”. The Security Council noted that the UNCT would assume MINUJUSTH programmatic and technical assistance roles and encouraged MINUJUSTH to collaborate with the UNCT for a seamless transition.

To achieve the UNCT mandate, the World Food Programme (WFP) as lead agency in Haiti proposed establishing a “One UN” facility and requested MINUJUSTH to gift several million dollars of assets and materials to WFP in Haiti. According to the UN’s financial rules, MINUJUSTH could sell its assets to WFP at a “nominal price” if it determined that the “interests of the United Nations will be served” and if the equipment was “not required for current or future peacekeeping operations or other United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions”.

Since it was unclear that gifting the specific equipment requested would serve the interests of the UN, the ensuing discussion focused on balancing the seemingly conflicting principles of complying with the Financial Rules and facilitating UN integration in Haiti. The wrong decision could either deprive UN Member States of their appropriate financial credit or reduce the collective resources available for furthering overall UN objectives in Haiti.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) had delegated authorities for the disposal of UN property while complying with UN Financial Rules and Regulations. After considerable discussions between and among the WFP team in Haiti, MINUJUSTH, the UN Department of Operational Support, and WFP headquarters, a service-level agreement was negotiated for WFP to provide certain services to BINUH on a cost-recovery basis. It was agreed that this arrangement provided significant benefits to the UN and thus justified the gifting or sale at nominal cost of a subset of equipment originally requested by WFP.

This seemingly mundane administrative question became the catalyst for a broader discussion about responsibilities related to delegation of authorities and backstopping by UN Headquarters. It was important for the entire Mission Leadership Team to engage in discussions regarding the contrast between the mission’s obligation to recoup as much of the assessed funding provided by Member States as possible with the operational imperatives of meaningful integration. The MINUJUSTH SRSG, the Deputy SRSG (Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator), the Chief of Mission Support, the Chief of Staff and the Police Commissioner were all engaged in these discussions, and in lively discussions with their respective counterparts in UNHQ and the UNCT.

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MINUJUSTH, 2019