Chapter 4.
Creating a Secure and Stable Environment

SUMMARY

A secure and stable environment is characterized by a reasonable level of public order which allows the population to pursue its daily activities in relative safety. Furthermore, the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been reasserted in order to deter both internal and external aggression upon the state, its institutions and its people. In a United Nations peace operation, the police and military components of a mission often play a key role in helping to create a secure and stable environment, until the host government is in a position to maintain its own internal and external security. This may involve the legitimate use of force by the mission, which must be carefully calibrated and linked to the desired political outcomes. Overall, the mission should project strength and credibility and not allow spoilers' use of violence to undermine a peace process. Meanwhile, the mission should also use this opportunity to partner with the host government in reforming the security sector.

This chapter discusses a set of six operational-level outputs, each with its own set of activities, risks and benchmarks, which together contribute to the overall outcome of creating a secure and stable environment.

1. **Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained.** This output emphasises the separation of parties to a conflict in order to allow the peacekeeping force to monitor their actions through the establishment of areas of control. In the short term, this helps limit the suffering of civilians and asserts control over armed forces in support of ceasefires, thereby building confidence in a fragile peace process.

2. **Civilians Protected.** This output reflects the fact that civilians are at risk and are often targeted during armed conflict. The most vulnerable groups are women, children, refugees, IDPs, minorities and the elderly. Protecting these groups using integrated and holistic mission responses is vital to preventing suffering and strengthening confidence in the peace process in the eyes of the local population, neighbouring countries and the international community.
3. **Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised.** This output highlights the free flow of people and goods, and the social integration of isolated communities without fear of physical harm or disruption, leading to the normalisation of daily life and economic growth. However, freedom of movement by the mission can be challenged by various factors, including hostilities, opposing factions, natural disasters or even an uncooperative host state conscious of its sovereignty. All these factors must be managed by the various mission components.

4. **Threats from Spoilers Managed.** This output highlights the challenges spoilers pose to the peace process. Spoilers come from a variety of sources but, in differing ways, they all work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. Managing threats from spoilers requires the development of discrete strategies based on a rigorous peace and conflict analysis. Spoiler management requires the integration of intelligence, law-enforcement, political, security, diplomatic and development resources. Credible local institutions must be harnessed and supported. These approaches must be based on sound and deep intelligence as well as wide sharing of information among all actors that can understand the nodal relationships among all of the spoilers.

5. **Public Order Established.** This output reflects the fact that public disorder is profoundly destabilizing and undercuts efforts to strengthen state security institutions. It is often accompanied by widespread violations of human rights. The judicial system tends to be weak and confidence in its ability to adjudicate cases is low, while prisons are often overflowing. Public order is essential if the population is to gain confidence in the public security system rather than seek security from other illegitimate entities such as militias and warlords. Supporting the host government in the re-establishment of public order is a whole-of-mission task mission task, with the police component taking the lead at the tactical level.

6. **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented.** This output emphasises the fact that integrated DDR processes may contribute to security and stability in a post-conflict environment, allowing recovery and development to sustain peace. Dealing with combatants is a first-order step in moving towards peace and reconciliation and creates confidence in the peace process. All stakeholders will have different expectations and agendas, and the peacekeeping mission will always be expected to deliver more than time and capacity will allow. The key is to balance what is possible against what the stakeholders believe should be possible within a given time.
Each of the six outputs listed above generates a set of considerations, which reflect the inevitable polarities inherent in an environment and society traumatized by recent conflict. These point to the need to balance conflicting issues, such as:

» the effect of the use of force on political legitimacy and impartiality;
» the mismatch between limited mission capabilities and local/national expectations;
» the host state’s burgeoning sense of sovereignty and the mission’s need to implement its mandate through the status of forces agreement (SOFA);
» the long-term need to confront impunity while continuing to secure short-term support for the peace process;
» the tensions between DDR programmes, local security, and civilian expectations; and
» the need to deal with national security forces for short-term security while initiating the needed long-term SSR.
What is a Secure and Stable Environment?

A secure and stable environment is primarily characterized by the absence of large-scale hostilities, violence, and the lingering threat posed by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which allows the civilian population to pursue its daily activities in relative safety. In such an environment, there is a reasonable level of public order, the state holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the population enjoys physical security and freedom of movement, and the country’s borders are managed to mitigate the effects of transnational organised crime (see 4.4 Threats from Spoilers Managed), and to protect against invasion or infiltration by foreign armies or armed groups. A peace operation—and in particular its police and military components—often plays a key role in creating a secure and stable environment until the host government is in a position to maintain internal and external security. In so doing, the mission can also support the first steps towards reform (see Chapter 5).

The changing character of conflict, along with an increase in the number of regional partnerships, have made UN peace operations more complex. There may be other military forces operating in parallel to, or with a different mandate or purpose from, the UN mission. Operations may also be bilateral, as in the French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, or the African Union Mission in Somalia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Afghanistan. It is important for mission leadership to identify and map the other actors present in the country and establish relationships with each country not officially contributing troops to the UN mission. This effort will ensure parallel forces are not working at cross purposes, reduce the potential for “friendly” fire incidents, ensure accountability for violations of international law, and reduce the confusion of those citizens the mission is supposed to protect.

The use of force

When the MLT determines that other means—in particular, political dialogue—have not been effective and force must be used to fulfil its mandated tasks, the use of force must be linked to the desired political outcomes. The mission should project strength and not allow the use of violence by spoilers to undermine a peace process. This means that it has to demonstrate a credible, flexible force posture and presence which does not yield to the unlawful use of force by non-state actors.

Military commanders and their units must have a mindset that demonstrates a resolve, readiness and capacity to respond appropriately to hostile acts and threats of violence. UN military units must openly...
display professional conduct at all times. Shows of force, and of the determination and resolve to act, contribute to military credibility and may reduce the need to use force. Using agile, mobile and robust forces in an indirect approach to deter spoilers, pre-empt destabilizing actions and neutralize threats can often calm a volatile situation. It also reassures the population and provides a visible demonstration of external support that allows other elements of the peace process to be implemented.

The use of force depends on an understanding of the specific situation and the threat environment. It should be part of the political strategy of the mission; legal; consistent with the rules of engagement (ROE) for the military or the Directive on the Use of Force for the police; proportionate; critically necessary; and capable of achieving the desired outcome. When needed, force should be used to deter, pre-empt, neutralize and consolidate. Reliable intelligence is essential for the effective, proportionate and judicious use of force.

**Deter**

Deterrence refers to actions taken to discourage potentially hostile acts. It requires that the UN has communicated its intent of responding with the use of force under certain conditions, and that this is perceived as a credible commitment, which means that the UN is capable, effective, and able to carry out its mandate. It is reinforced if the mission has responded to earlier breaches through similar resolute actions.

Examples of deterring actions include adopting a strong deterrent posture, conducting visible patrols and establishing check points. Additional actions might include demonstrations of mobility and speed in the redeployment of troops; information networking; regular security surveys, inspections and assessments of facilities, camps and bases in the area of operation/interest; strengthening UN installation physical security; and engaging in community-based activities.

Deterrence serves to dissuade a spoiler from using violence where the mission is present, encourages confidence among the local population and supports the mission security framework. Deterrence activities need to be communicated to the adversary, through contact with potentially violent actors where possible. Dialogue with local communities and engagement with both male and female representatives of those communities is essential to achieving situational awareness. Implementing a good strategic communications plan is essential for deterrence.
Pre-empt

Pre-emption refers to active measures to contain an identified threat against civilians, UN and associated personnel or UN installations, and/or to gain advantage over a threatening group before it can carry out a hostile act.

Examples of pre-emptive actions by peacekeepers include interpositioning and shows of force or manoeuvring of forces to demonstrate resolve and defuse situations; enforcing curfews, cordon and search operations; targeted use of necessary and proportionate force against identified potential hostile acts and hostile threats; apprehension and detention operations; and tactical redeployment of troops to guard key infrastructure, terrain or targeted groups, consistent with the ROE. Again, this must be accompanied by a well-developed strategic communications plan and a “Do No Harm” approach to avoid unintended consequences for the population and general resistance against the mission.

Neutralize

Neutralizing refers to actions that involve the necessary and proportionate use of force to neutralize, isolate or render ineffective a hostile act endangering life and/or impeding implementation of mandated tasks such as the protection of civilians. Peacekeeper responses should be timely and assertive, as authorized by the mandate and the ROE. Examples of neutralizing actions include physical protection and evacuation of civilians at risk; direct confrontation; robust camp defence; search and rescue; and close air support.

Consolidate

Consolidation refers to activities to manage the situation after a hostile threat has subsided. It involves actions to deny spoilers the ability to restore their capability, and assisting the local population and host-country authorities in normalizing the situation. The MLT should act swiftly and robustly, together with the host government, to ensure that the rule of law is reinstated and upheld, and that spoilers are brought to justice. This not only supports national and local ownership, but also serves to deter future hostile actions. Examples of consolidation actions include support for DDR activities; security support to facilitate civilian-led humanitarian activities; the establishment of procedures to monitor and safeguard buffer zones and treaty compliance; threat assessment; and robust defence. Consolidation requires an active strategic communications plan.
Preconditions for success

- An agreement forms the basis of the peace process, the implementation of which leads to a sustained settlement of the conflict.
- All major parties to the conflict are committed to the peace process.
- International/regional partners support the peace process.
- TCCs/PCCs remain committed to pledges, which include training, preparation, equipment and willingness to act robustly when needed.
- National authorities develop the capacity to address security and stability issues.

Benchmarks

The following benchmarks represent a desired end state, which may take many years to achieve, and which therefore calls for perseverance and long-term engagement.

- Large-scale armed conflict has ended, a ceasefire or peace agreement is being implemented, violent spoilers are controlled and immediate impacts of mines and ERW are being addressed.
- Police institutional structures are in place and services are functioning throughout the country.
- Fair popular access to justice has improved.
- Public order prevails; laws are respected and enforced, while criminal and political violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements are pursued, arrested and tried.
- National security services operate lawfully and enjoy the support of the public, while major illegal armed groups have been identified and disarmed.
- No part of the population lives in fear of threats to physical safety; displaced people can return safely; and critical infrastructure and key historical and cultural sites are being protected.
- There is freedom of movement for all parts of society throughout the country and across its borders, which are reasonably secured against invasion or infiltration by armed groups, as well as the illegal movement of goods (especially weapons or drugs) and people across borders, which is part of the remit of the UN Police (UNPOL) on organized crime.
MINUSCA: Red lines and the use of force

A critical question for the leadership of a UN peace operation is how far a mission can go in using force, and when it is right to do so. While the grounds for the use of force are likely to be fairly well defined in the mandate (usually in terms of the need to protect civilians, probably also to protect the mission and humanitarian actors, and to defend the mandate) and reflected in the military Concept of Operations and Rules of Engagement, much will depend on the interpretation of, for example, what constitutes a threat to civilians, or when it is justifiable for a mission to defend its mandate by force.

For example, in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), when certain ex-Seleka groups were threatening to march on Bambari (the second biggest city in the country), the mission decided that its protection of civilians (POC) mandate meant that it could set “red lines”, beyond which armed groups would face the use of force. When some rebels breached these red lines, the mission justified air strikes in terms of protecting civilians.

UN peace operation must not be a party to the conflict, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which acts as the guardian of international humanitarian law, was clear that the airstrikes would have compromised the mission’s status were it not for the specific warnings given that this was how we would interpret our POC mandate.

It was important for MINUSCA to have thought through the implications and consequences of the airstrikes. These questions of interpretation are likely to arise during a crisis situation and a mission leader may have little time to decide what they can do. So, having a sound understanding of the limits, and indeed of how far those limits can be stretched, is essential.

Diane Corner,
DSRSG, MINUSCA, 2014–17
Outputs

In summary, the six operational outputs that contribute to creating a secure and stable environment are:

1. Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained
2. Civilians Protected
3. Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised
4. Threats from Spoilers Managed
5. Public Order Established
6. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented
4.1 Warring Factions Separated and Violent Conflict Contained

While not applicable in all situations, separating forces reduces tensions so that continued negotiations, cooperation and implementation of a peace process can proceed. The separation of warring parties involves establishing distinct areas of control that keep factions apart, and allows the peacekeeping force to monitor their actions. This helps limit civilians’ exposure to conflict and asserts control over armed forces, thereby building confidence in the peace process. The separation of combatants should be followed by observation and monitoring of a ceasefire. Establishing control and preventing large-scale fighting demonstrates the authority and forcefulness of the mission and generates credibility, which will set the tone for future actions and compliance by the parties. The role of the peacekeeping force in ensuring a secure environment is vital until the national authorities are capable of providing security.

The nature of the conflict will determine the disposition of separation, varying from buffer zones (e.g. in interstate conflicts or secessionist intra-state conflicts) to areas or zones of separation that create a neutral space or “no-man’s land” (e.g. in some internal conflicts where combatants and civilians intermingle). The boundaries and entry points of these zones should be agreed on by all parties, clearly marked, and identifiable on a map or formal record. In the final analysis, ending armed conflict and securing long-term peace require political, not military, solutions.

4.1.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Deployment of troops and UN police to zones of separation.
- Deployment of UN police and formed police units (FPUs) in population centres.
- Establishing joint confidence- and security-building measures for monitoring compliance with a ceasefire or other military agreement, and improving coordination through liaison officers or joint commissions.
- Establishing control measures for the separation of forces, weapons and ammunition, equipment, and the movement of personnel.
4.1.2 Benchmarks

Short-term
- Mechanisms for implementing security arrangements are established and functioning.
- The mission’s strategic communications strategy is implemented.
- Control measures are in place.
- Monitoring is in place and functioning.
- DDR programmes have been planned and implementation has started.
- The mission supports SSR discussions among key national stakeholders and preparations are made for an initiation of a SSR process, if applicable.
- Priority mine action tasks completed, if applicable.

Medium-term
- Continued implementation of DDR.
- A national SSR programme is being implemented.
- All factions separated and complying with the control measures.
- All designated weapons have been cantoned in accordance with relevant agreements and the DDR programme.
- Factions are complying with the security provisions of the peace agreement.
- Incidents of violence involving former combatants are significantly reduced.

Long-term
- Factions have been integrated and are part of the government process.
- Factions refrain from using violence to settle grievances or gain political power.
- The security situation is conducive to the return of IDPs and refugees.
- Final phases of DDR are being implemented.
- SSR programmes consolidated and yielding long-term results with support of all key stakeholders.
4.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Separating warring factions requires that the HoM make significant efforts to keep all belligerents engaged in the process. The FC will have responsibility for monitoring compliance with security arrangements in accordance with the mission’s mandate. If the peace operation is taking over responsibility from another force, the MLT (in particular the SRSG and the FC) should ensure that the transition is closely coordinated with the DPO and the DOS, as well as the authorities responsible for the previous force. Joint mechanisms should be established to coordinate with factions.

4.1.4 Resources

Timely deployment of the mission’s uniformed personnel requires adequate resources, with sufficient capacity and capability and with the appropriate directives to establish control measures. The mission should also have access to suitable technology for surveillance and monitoring compliance, either through TCCs/PCCs or through contracted services. Experts should be recruited to support the DDR and SSR processes at a time when the conditions are right.

4.1.5 Challenges and risks

• Compliance is not universal, or factions do not respect all the elements of the relevant agreements.
• Fragmented/renegade/spoiler groups continue fighting, or the peace process/agreement fails and conflict resumes.
• Conflict spreads beyond the borders of the mission area.
• Regional or other transnational actors subvert the peace process.
• The impartiality of the mission is compromised by apparent or perceived support of one party over another.
• The peacekeeping force is unable to accomplish its mandate due to operational inflexibility and restrictions, undeclared national caveats (restrictions placed by TCCs on the use of their force) or lack of capability, capacity and training.
• Lack of political ownership for the necessary reforms within the police, security and justice institutions.
4.1.6 Considerations

Mission posture

Separating warring factions may, in some circumstances, require the use of force, especially where spoilers are present and/or a culture of impunity is prevalent. While assertive action ensures credibility, excessive force might jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission and alienate certain groups or enable spoilers to rally the population against the intervention. Finding a way to balance this trade-off is essential and may involve the engagement of the police component through the deployment of FPUs that are proficient in the use of lethal and less-lethal force against non-military threats. Because peace is fragile at this stage, the impact of all actions and the risks of reigniting conflict should be carefully assessed. Understanding and exercising the principles of impartiality and consent is essential, as is the availability of a range of both lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

Area deployment or point defence

Force levels in peacekeeping operations are almost never sufficient for the scale and number of tasks. The military component is usually spread very thinly over large areas and it is hard to concentrate force. Additionally, much military capability is taken up by self-protection of the mission and its vulnerable bases. The extent to which the mission concentrates on defending points and bases or providing wide area security is a balance of judgement between spreading forces so thinly that they are ineffective or, conversely, concentrating them in a few key areas and leaving parts of the country and civilians unprotected. In practice a mission must be able to do both and have the intelligence and flexibility to recalibrate and redeploy to counter new threats. A similar dilemma is faced by UNPOL in its deployment of FPUs. A balance must be struck between their public order policing tasks and their deployment in place of the military for security duties.
4.2 Civilians Protected

The protection of civilians (POC) is included in the mandates of most contemporary peace operations. Civilians are at risk in fragile environments and are targeted during armed conflict. The most vulnerable groups are women, children, refugees, IDPs, minorities and the elderly. Protecting these groups is vital to preventing suffering and strengthening confidence in the peace process in the eyes of the local population, neighbouring countries and the international community. The mission’s protection activities need to be framed within a sound political process and go well beyond physical security. This calls for a comprehensive approach involving all mission components and external actors.21

POC refers to “all necessary action”, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within the capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect civilians. All necessary action includes any political, developmental, humanitarian or other non-violent means that may be required to ensure civilian protection in the long term. It therefore requires an all-of-mission approach if threats are to be countered. A “threat” exists from the moment it is identified as a potential source of harm to civilians to the time it is no longer determined as such.

The three tiers of protection of civilians

Tier 1. Protection through dialogue and engagement

Tier 1 covers political or diplomatic efforts encompassing political engagement in, advocacy for and assistance with the effective implementation of a peace agreement, conflict mediation, political pressure and advocacy, community reconciliation efforts or other political measures to resolve conflict (see 3.2 Peace Process Supported, and 3.4 National Reconciliation Promoted).

Tier 2. Provision of physical protection

Tier 2 includes patrolling outposts, monitoring force deployments, area security and other actions to prevent, deter and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. These are normally

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duties for the military component, but FPUs from UNPOL are also armed and likely to be in the front line of physical protection (including deterrence).

**Tier 3. Establishing a protective environment**

Tier 3 encompasses efforts to enhance the safety and support the rights of civilians through promoting and monitoring legal protections and human rights, facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting national institutions and facilitating SSR, DDR and transitional justice. It includes peacebuilding measures to further good governance, the rule of law, social well-being and economic sustainability to reduce the chances that future grievances will result in conflict that threatens civilians. The role of UNPOL’s international police officers (IPOs) should be considered.

However, the provisions on protection from physical violence are open to interpretation. In many cases, there can be very different views—including within the UN Security Council, in the mission and among TCCs—on their exact scope and nature. In addition, a mission’s resources, ability and capacity to protect all civilians do not always match the expectations of the international community and the local population. A strategic communications plan will be vital to manage these expectations.

Missions should support the three tiers of POC from an understanding of the changing vulnerabilities and levels of threat to the various sections of the civilian population. This requires a regular assessment of the operating environment, its actors and dynamics. Missions must conduct effective assessments and manage intelligence and multi-source information to guide their actions on protecting civilians.

**4.2.1 Operational activities**

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

- Developing a POC strategy.
- Identifying vulnerable sections of the population, such as women, children, minorities and IDPs, and their protection needs, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).
- Establishing a presence in key areas of potential volatility.
- Establishing joint protection teams consisting of Military, Police and Civilian components.
- Responding to or preventing the forced displacement of civilians.
4.2.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

• All vulnerable sectors of the population have been identified.
• Sufficient presence has been established in key areas to deter major outbreaks of violence, including CRSV.
• Mechanisms created for interaction with other actors and the local population.
• Security zones and areas established as needed.
• Effective monitoring is preventing or reducing acts of violence.
• Main roads and volatile areas are cleared of ERW (if applicable) and patrolled.
• The public information strategy has been planned and is being implemented.
• Key IDP camps are secured.
• Protection issues have been incorporated into SSR and DDR programmes.
• A comprehensive plan for mine action is in place.

Medium-term

• Incidents are being investigated and documented, and the national authorities are taking appropriate action, including on CRSV.
• The number of incidents (including of all forms of sexual violence) have decreased.
• Advocacy programmes are working and effective.
• Government policy exists on the protection of civilians, including CRSV.
• Legitimate and capable host state security forces are being developed.
• People have access to legal recourse.
• Property issues are being addressed by the national authorities.
• Information campaigns and education on human rights are under way.
• Civilians can move on key thoroughfares safely.
• Forced displacement of civilians is not occurring.
• Relief and medical treatment are being provided to vulnerable groups and survivors of sexual violence.
**Long-term**

- The host government has the will and has built the capacity and capability to protect civilians and counter CRSV, with legitimate police forces performing the main role.
- Justice, governance and reconciliation efforts are well established at the national, regional and local levels.
- An improvement in sustainable security as measured by access by the civilian population—in particular, women and girls—to food, water, shelter, education, public services and economic opportunity.

### 4.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Notwithstanding the host government’s primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting civilians, peace operations are often mandated to protect civilians, in part because the national authorities lack the capacity or will to protect the civilian population. Increasingly missions are judged upon their ability to protect civilians. POC requires a whole-of-mission effort; it therefore becomes the MLT’s business to ensure that POC responsibilities are clearly cascaded down throughout the mission. Protection efforts should therefore include multiple components of the peace operation, in addition to the uniformed personnel, such as Political Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information, and Civil Affairs, as well as coordination mechanisms such as the JOC and JMAC. This requires a mission-specific POC strategy and, where necessary, regional POC plans. Additionally, regular political engagement with the host government and major political parties by the HoM and the MLT is essential to preventing and bringing to a halt to attacks and violence against civilians.

No single actor has access to all of the information or expertise required to plan and conduct the wide range of protection activities that can be used to support civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. In addition to improving cooperation between the components of the mission, the MLT must establish effective coordination and communications arrangements with other relevant UN agencies and other actors on protection issues. Developing protection strategies in consultation with humanitarian actors is crucial. Protection activities—including the mitigation of CRSV—should also be coordinated with the national authorities, civil society groups and other representatives of the civilian population. SGBV should be recognized as a responsibility of the host government. Gender discrimination and inequality lie at the heart of CRSV.
4.2.4 Resources

If the mandate of a peace operation has POC provisions, the mission should have the training, early capacity and capability to carry out the necessary tasks. Within the broad range of resource requirements, the availability of enabling assets, particularly aviation, is critical. UNPOL may deploy FPUs. In addition, the mission needs high quality information management and intelligence to be successful, as well as sufficient numbers of translators and interpreters to enable communication and understanding of cultural sensitivities.

In the likely event that a mission faces gaps in these resources, the MLT should inform UNHQ and the Security Council of its requirements and the implications of continuing shortfalls. The mission should also prioritize its requirements and the allocation of protection assets. UNPOL plays a significant and flexible role in protecting civilians. IPOs are often the main interlocutors with host-state police and therefore have both a presence and a network among host-state police officers and local communities.

The basic needs of the people should be met primarily by the government or through humanitarian operations, which should be adequately supported (see 6.1 Secure and Effective Humanitarian Relief Supported). Since long-term solutions depend on the development of local capacity and capability, international donors and UN entities such as UNDP should marshal adequate resources.
### 4.2.5 Challenges and risks

- The national security forces or elements therein are complicit in preying on elements of the civilian population, requiring management of the HRDDP in the interpretation of continuing support for the host government.
- Threats against civilians do not come from armed groups but from other less identifiable civilians for complex local reasons.
- The peacekeeping mission has neither the capacity nor the capability to carry out its POC mandate.
- The expectations of the local population exceed the ability and capability of the mission to protect civilians.
- The population is scattered, with groups being out of reach of the national authorities or the peacekeeping mission.
- Sustained political engagement by the Security Council may be difficult to obtain and/or UN Member States are failing to apply pressure on host governments that are not fulfilling their responsibility to protect their populations.

### 4.2.6 Considerations

*Balancing short-term security imperatives and investments in long-term, host-state capacity building*

The immediate requirement to protect civilians needs to be balanced against development of the host government’s capability, capacity and accountability to take on this responsibility. With limited resources, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term needs. The need for immediate security may divert donor resources and attention from longer-term SSR processes. Demonstrating quick wins can build credibility but may jeopardize development of a foundation for deeper SSR reform. Personal security will probably be the most urgent issue for citizens in post-conflict societies. It is one of the elements of good governance that affects early perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and thus will almost always be one of the first and most important public tasks. Those providing security will often lay claim to leadership while also having the support of citizens who see them as the only immediate option for the protection of person and property, however undemocratic and unaccountable they may be.
Managing international, national and local expectations

The MLT will immediately be required to deal with expectations regarding the provision of security and POC. The legitimacy and commitment to the peace process may suffer if expectations are not adequately managed. Strategic communications are crucial to ensuring that the local population has a realistic understanding of the mandate and capability of the mission.

Temporary or permanent deployment pattern

POC, as well as monitoring and observation of the warring factions, may require a composite model of deployment involving a mix of temporary locations around civilian and urban centres and deployment along conflict lines and security zones. The former can be readjusted when no longer required. The mission should balance its resources and capabilities against the actual needs on the ground in order to determine the appropriate application of resources and manpower. Temporary patterns will better support fluid operations and clearance activities; permanent patterns will better support peacebuilding activities.

Balancing the protection of the local population with the protection of UN personnel

The mission may face a dilemma when balancing its POC mandate against its responsibility to protect UN personnel (both within the mission and in the wider UN system). Expectations must be managed as resources will always be stretched.

Balancing imperative to protect civilians with the political need to ensure host-state support for the peace process

The mission may face a dilemma if host-government security forces are identified as perpetrators of violence against civilians. The mission will have to find ways to end this behaviour while maintaining consent at the operational and tactical levels across the mission area. Missions are frequently mandated to support host-government security forces, and it is imperative that the human rights principles and the HRDDP by which it is implemented are discussed with the host government. This calls for the vetting of supported units and commanders (which may include armed groups), as well as a close dialogue with the host-government authorities, which is a sensitive process requiring political finesse.
4.3 Freedom of Movement Regained and Exercised

Freedom of movement entails the free flow of people and goods without fear of physical harm or disruption. At the same time, illicit commodities and other sources of instability must have their movement disrupted. Free movement promotes the normalization of daily life and economic growth, such as access to schools and markets, as well as the social integration of isolated communities.

Freedom of movement can be challenged by various factors, including hostilities between warring factions; the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by one or more parties; natural disasters; and an uncooperative host state. Hostilities between parties are likely to prevent movement of the civilian population and can severely restrict the freedom of movement of the mission. The Military component would be considerably slowed down in areas and times where fighting is ongoing, and the movement of the mission’s civilian component or UNPOL may be curtailed. Although the risk of casualties would be low, an uncooperative host state can make movement difficult for all the mission’s components by administrative and political means, threatening the mission’s ability to fulfil its mandate.

While hostilities between parties and an uncooperative host state are subject to political solutions, maintaining freedom of movement in an environment in which explosive ordnance and IEDs constitute a threat is a military—technical issue. An aggressor may deploy IEDs to reduce or prevent the freedom of movement of the forces it is targeting. This often creates a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment in which such aggressors have freedom to operate and are able to project their power. Maintaining freedom of movement within an IED-threat environment is therefore a key focus of IED-threat mitigation via explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities.

Establishing rules on where to enable, limit or deny access will be a key consideration for the MLT in its dealings with the host government. Conversely, parties on the ground might test the credibility and resilience of peacekeepers by restricting their freedom of movement. As a result, it is essential that the mission’s Military component secures the operational and tactical mobility of all personnel across the mission area. Cooperation on this matter may also be an indicator of the general level of consent for and commitment to the peace process, and of overall consent for the presence of the peace operation.
4.3.1 Operational activities

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

- Identifying, through study, the vulnerabilities of key routes.
- Tracking the viability of all routes via the JOC.
- Establishing an EOD/IED threat-mitigation working group.
- Developing EOD capabilities, removing ERW from abandoned storage sites and promoting safe ammunition management.
- Implementing and sustaining the SOFA or status of mission agreement (SOMA).
- Exploiting IED events through technical and tactical analysis.
- Contributing to the degradation of IED networks by implementing recording and recovery of EO components.

4.3.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

- Routes and air heads are secure, and alternate routes are established.
- Humanitarian supplies are moving.
- Spoilers and their areas of operation have been identified.
- Mines and IEDs identified and priorities for clearing established.

Medium-term

- Population can move on key routes without violence.
- Key strategic resources are protected.
- Police has restored law and order in critical areas.
- Status of routes updated.

Long-term

- National authorities are able to ensure full freedom of movement for people and goods throughout the territory.
- Re-establishment of customs and border procedures consistent with international standards.
- Mine action continues.
4.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The host government is responsible for ensuring freedom of movement for its population and the peacekeeping mission. The SRSG will need to urge and remind all parties to adhere to their agreements. The mission needs to track the state of freedom of movement through the JOC and the Force HQ. Meanwhile, the FC and the Police Commissioner need to ensure compliance on the ground. Components involved in mine action (both military and civilian) will also have an important role to play with regard to freedom of movement, as will the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant UN agencies dealing with the movement of refugees and IDPs. Coordination is therefore essential, as is close political engagement with the parties.

4.3.4 Resources

Mission resources and deployment timelines will determine both when and which freedom of movement activities are implemented. Early resources and speed of deployment will facilitate compliance with agreements. Donors need to provide appropriate resources for mine action so that routes and essential locations can be cleared. Technological assets will have to be available to enable this task.

4.3.5 Challenges and risks

- Host government gradually adopts a stance of non-compliance with the terms of the SOFA.
- Host government cannot ensure freedom of movement.
- Lack of credible information on mine and ERW contamination.
- Peace process falters and fighting resumes.
- Factions/spoilers restrict the movement and/or access of peace operations personnel.
- Factions/spoilers use freedom of movement to exert political leverage.
- Territorial integrity is lacking, enabling influx of external spoilers.
- Regional actors are not supportive.
4.3.6 Considerations

Balancing freedom of movement and security

Population and resource controls may initially need to be implemented to control factions and spoilers and establish security. The extent to which this is required will depend on the situation. These controls should be explained to the population in order to maintain transparency in the mission’s communications and to manage public expectations.

Balancing the required performance with the available capabilities

Counter-IED/mine intelligence requires the fusion of multiple information layers to provide a detailed understanding of spoiler-IED tactics, techniques and procedures; every unit must maintain a current and clear understanding of the status of each route. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will provide technical capability for the identification of IEDs and mines. Electronic counter-IED assets can be utilized as a threat-mitigation asset on vehicles or on personnel required to move from, through or to an area with an assessed radio-controlled IED threat. Force generation to obtain the necessary capabilities is a highly politicized process that requires a good tripartite relationship between the MLT, TCCs and the DPO.

Immediate or gradual movement controls

Immediate and gradual movement controls each have their pros and cons. While experience shows that the latter are more viable and pragmatic, humanitarian considerations may well determine the appropriate type of controls.

Controlling movement of national resources

In a resource-based conflict, protection and prevention of the illegitimate movement of national and strategic resources could be of great significance. Consequently, movement control efforts and other security tasks related to this issue will have to be prioritized from the inception of the mission.
Respecting host-country sovereignty while maintaining freedom of movement for the mission

As a host government maintains (or regains) control of its territory, possible interruption, restrictions or even denial of mission movement may occur. The SOFA/SOMA should be forward looking and adaptable, as the host government exerts increased sovereignty over its territories. Full freedom of movement is essential for a mission from an operational view, as restrictions can inhibit its ability to perform mandated tasks. In addition, accepting limitations imposed by the parties automatically undermines the credibility of the mission, signalling that it can be manipulated without consequences.
UNMIS: Maximizing operational effect of the military component

With increased threats in peacekeeping environments and attacks on UN bases and personnel, there has been a growing demand for more troops for force protection. An emerging dilemma for mission leadership is ensuring a balanced military deployment that secures static installations while retaining sufficient mobility to respond to developing critical situations.

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a mandated strength of approximately 10,000 troops to support the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While South Sudan supported UNMIS operations, looking forward to the 2011 Independence Referendum, operational consent was selective in the north, especially in Darfur and Abyei. Many UNMIS troops were thus hesitant to maneuver.

Since surface mobility was confined to mine-cleared roads, cross-country movement was being conducted by daytime aviation effort. The mission had limited access to outer reaches, mostly being provided by military observer long-range patrols with limited staying power.

There was a necessity to infuse maneuver culture in the mission to sustain control of far-flung areas, which was crucial for effective monitoring of the 1956 border Trans Line redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and South Sudan People’s Liberation Army.

Thus, UNMIS pioneered the concept of a temporary operating base (TOB)—a light footprint deployment for conducting need-based tasks. There was initial resistance from troop-contributing countries as well as the Director of Mission Support, as this required effort.

TOBs were provided with field scale accommodation, rations and medical support. They became additional pivots for gaining access to the entire geographical space. Initially two TOBs were deployed, one each in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Later each sector developed the capability to deploy one TOB. TOBs can be an effective way for the mission to establish freedom of movement and dominate space economically.

4.4 Threats from Spoilers Managed

Threats to the peace process come from a variety of sources. Spoilers are agents, organizations or factions that work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. Working sometimes in tandem, but also independently, spoilers perceive the peace process as threatening their world view, power or interests (often financial) and are willing to use both violent and non-violent means to achieve their objectives.

Spoilers can be domestic or international and can include but are not limited to violent extremists and terrorists, criminals (both organized and unorganized) and warring factions. Conflict zones are politicized regions of insecurity that can be conducive to various types of spoilers (political, ideological and criminal) that may lead to armed violence.

Managing threats from these spoilers requires the development of discrete strategies to address each type based on a deep understanding of their intentions, motivations, level of commitment and interactions (see 2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations, and the subsection on context analyses). In addition to understanding the goals of spoilers, the mission must understand their political/social strategy and financial strategy, as well as the networks in which they operate, their leadership and organizational structures, the interrelationships among spoiler groups and the decision-making process. Spoilers can be categorized according to: (a) their relationship to the peace process; (b) their willingness to negotiate in the context of the peace process; and (c) their willingness to use violence.

Distinguishing between spoilers

Relationship to the peace process

Spoilers can be inside or outside of the peace process. Inside spoilers are part of the host government or a party to an agreement that has failed to abide by that agreement and places obstacles in the path of the process that prevent the UN mission from carrying out its mandate. Outside spoilers have not signed up or agreed to the peace process and can use any means to prevent that process from succeeding. Some outside spoilers are conflict entrepreneurs, whose commitments to ending conflict are subordinate to their lucrative exploitation of the conflict. All of these spoilers can be empowered by existing criminal power structures and linkages to transnational organized crime. Each presents different challenges for the MLT.
Willingness to negotiate

Another type of spoiler may have limited goals, such as power sharing, redressing grievances, security or access to resources. Such spoilers are willing to negotiate to achieve these goals in the context of a peace process. The peace process may have to be adjusted to accommodate their goals. Other spoilers may seek total power based on ideological or religious views that are non-negotiable and outside of the peace process. Conflict entrepreneurs will evaluate the costs and benefits to determine which negotiation path provides them with the most lucrative outcome or if they must seek to obtain their goals through intimidation (see 3.2 Peace Process Supported).

Willingness to use violence

Some spoilers may not be willing to negotiate, may be driven by ideological or religious goals or may have had their criminal enterprises put at risk. This type of spoiler is more likely to use force than other types—a factor which must be considered when designing operational approaches. The way in which force is used should also be considered. An ideological or religiously driven spoiler may be using force in a manner consistent with IHL while remaining unwilling to negotiate and may therefore be seen as continued armed opposition.

Alternatively, a spoiler may use force with complete disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear through unpredictability (e.g. in terms of targeting), which would mean an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. Non-state groups using force in the pursuit of ideological or religious goal, with disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear, are sometimes referred to as terrorists. While a UN mission is not mandated to conduct counterterrorist operations, it is increasingly recognized that UN missions can be targets of terrorist activity and need to be able to protect themselves and their staff from it.

Operational approaches

The operational approach must not only address each type of spoiler, but also embrace the context in which they operate and the connections that empower and facilitate them. It must be understood that in some areas spoilers may be networked and operate in symbiotic relationships, therefore requiring the networking of mitigation efforts. In addition to considering each type of spoiler, MLTs, through the JMAC, must look for and exploit the critical nodes where criminality, extremism and politics intersect. This requires the integration of intelligence, law-enforcement, political, diplomatic and development resources.
Considerations for Mission Leadership

Institutions must be harnessed and supported. These approaches must be based on sound and deep intelligence as well as the sharing of information widely among all actors that can understand the nodal relationships among all of the spoilers. All operational approaches require integration not only at the mission level, but also in the host state and among other international actors outside the mission. All approaches must devise a robust strategic communications plan that addresses the social narratives that support extremism. The basic concept is to combine proactive, reactive and consequence-management measures to undermine the incentives for violence while promoting alternatives paths.

**Proactive measures**

Use positive measures to engage with spoilers and address their goals; strengthen or build accountable host-state institutions; preserve political momentum; deconstruct spoiler narratives and develop supportive narratives; create or support social educational programmes; engage with religious leaders and communities; engage with civil society with a focus on women and youth; strengthen and reform economic and financial institutions to include anti-corruption efforts; run a viable SSR and DDR programme; and secure borders and gain support from external neighbours.

**Reactive measures**

Use the integrated assets of the mission and national structures to weaken, persuade, compel and neutralize spoilers. Consider the appropriate combination of strategic communications, and diplomatic, political, economic, legal, law-enforcement and military means.

**Consequence-management measures**

Such measures address the social, economic, religious and political consequences of extreme spoiler acts.

**Impact of transnational organized crime mitigated**

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is more than a law-enforcement problem. Structured groups that commit serious crimes in the mission area for financial or other material benefit are a threat, and risk delaying or derailing both the mission and the peace process. TOC threatens the general security environment, state legitimacy (through corruption) and the legitimacy of the government when it is perceived to be beholden to criminal groups. Actors engaged in TOC may even be part of the government the mission is seeking to reform.
Therefore, an effective response to TOC requires a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach, in which the mission will be an important actor. The main focus of the mission’s activity will be to build capacity in the host country to mitigate the negative impact of TOC. The MLT might be asked to coordinate the activities of many stakeholders, including the host government and its relevant agencies, as well as regional and international organizations. In the past, many mission leaders ignored TOC and by the time it was recognized, it was extremely difficult to counter its negative impact. It is therefore extremely important that the MLT considers preventive measures early on to mitigate the impact of TOC.

**4.4.1 Operational activities**

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

- Identifying the different spoilers and understanding the connections between them.
- Engaging civil society, media, religious leaders and communities with a focus on women and youth.
- Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives.
- Reaching out to spoilers who are ready for negotiation and reconciliation.
- Assisting in identifying and developing mitigation strategies on TOC (including corruption and terrorism) with the host state.
- Soliciting internal and external support and resources, such as intelligence sharing, and establishing operational planning and coordination mechanisms with external actors.
4.4.2 Benchmarks

Short-term
- Intelligence and warning systems are in place.
- Presence established in key areas of potential volatility.
- Prevalence of transnational organised crime, including its type, scope and nature, identified.
- Local partners (e.g. civil society, religious or ethnic groups) that can assist in reasserting control and satisfying grievances identified and approached.
- Community outreach and educational programmes on de-radicalization initiated.
- Strategic communications with positive narratives to reduce support for spoilers and enhance the legitimacy of the mission and host state in place.
- Freedom of movement established.

Medium-term
- Expanded space for dialogue among all factions preserved.
- Impunity for criminal acts addressed.
- Recruitment by spoilers disrupted.
- Local leaders implicated in transnational organised crime replaced.
- Irreconcilable spoilers are isolated and neutralized.
- Former spoilers successfully reintegrated.

Long-term
- All relevant government bodies and institutions are held accountable.
- The host government has developed the necessary capacity to deliver needed services to the population.
- The general population, factions and elites all feel that their expectations are being met.
- Spoiler groups, especially violent extremists and terrorists, are politically and socially rejected, isolated and neutralized.
- Education campaigns that reject extremism implemented in formal programmes and the mass media.
- Civil society institutions have the capacity to mobilize without fear of undue interference from any entity.
4.4.3. Responsibilities and coordination

The host government is responsible for developing its capacity and capability to address spoilers, with the support of the mission, relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders. However, until the national authorities can fully assume this responsibility and be trusted by the population to deliver, the peacekeeping mission may be expected to deal with a range of spoiler issues, in close coordination with national security institutions. The DPO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) will be a key player in providing support to the mission in these areas. To be successful, strategic communications must be a focus of the MLT and coordinated at all levels.

Close cooperation should be promoted between the situational awareness and analytical capabilities of the JOC, JMAC, UNPOL’s criminal intelligence cell, and military intelligence (U2) branch, and where appropriate engage in information sharing with regional partners.

4.4.4 Resources

The mission—and in particular the JMAC, Military and Police components—should have sufficient training, capacity and capability, along with the appropriate ROE, to deal with spoiler challenges. SSR and DDR are central elements and will therefore require adequate funding and support from donors. Resources may also be required to develop penal, police and judicial facilities and sites. Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives will require investment in personnel and equipment as well as a focus by the MLT. Engaging with civil society institutions to build resilience should also be a focus of mission resources, along with educational programmes and consequence-management initiatives to heal communities after violent attacks.

Where possible, the MLT should consider reaching out to neighbouring and regional countries, as well as the wider UN system (e.g. the UN Office of Counter Terrorism and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime) and external organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to ensure cooperation and support on intelligence, planning and operational activities. These could provide valuable yet low-cost resources (including data, analysis and coordination mechanisms) for combating TOC.
4.4.5 Challenges and risks

- Spoiler networks are too entrenched and supported by external means that cannot be addressed.
- A deeply rooted culture of corruption can affect the mission’s most senior interlocutors.
- The existence or growth of national and transnational organized crime, including black markets in a symbiotic relationship with spoiler networks.
- TOC might represent a sizeable and accepted part of the local economy that is difficult to replace.
- Security and legal systems are corrupt and politicized, while crime is institutionalized and rooted in illicit revenue sources.
- Radical narratives have a stronger appeal than counter-narratives.
- Poorly conceived actions by the peacekeeping mission, including misconduct, can increase spoiler recruitment and undermine the legitimacy of the mission.
4.4.6 Considerations

**Balance counter spoiler actions with the unintended effect of driving individuals towards violent extremism**

The mission must “do no harm”. Use of kinetic military operations, ISR, border control, policing and the criminal justice system has the potential to push individuals towards violent reaction and extremism. Poorly designed strategic communications based on an inadequate understanding of social dynamics could negate efforts to discredit radical ideological narratives. This might also apply to peacebuilding programmes. Addressing the consequences of spoiler actions and terrorism through well-designed DDR, SSR and rule-of-law programmes will help in this regard.

**Engage with spoilers to include them in the peace process or seek justice for extremist actions**

Dealing with spoilers, including terrorists and organized crime groups, may be necessary for the peace process, rehabilitation, mitigating tensions and influencing other spoilers to participate. At the same time, ignoring the continuing use of political violence or exploitation of criminal networks will preserve a culture of impunity and threaten sustainable peace. Common ground and space for negotiations should be sought that includes civil society.

**Take account of the host country’s traditional mechanisms as well as international norms and standards**

When supporting change to a country’s governance culture, the mission should consider existing “rules” and behaviour, as well as the patterns of operation of previous security forces, which might not be easy to change and may have been effective. Successful SSR will depend on how well it reflects an understanding of existing institutions and historical patterns. Good governance will ultimately be provided only insofar as societal actors revise their notions of what public security is and how it operates.
Perceived legitimacy or perceived credibility

The imperative to manage TOC too hard and too quickly could create tensions with the host government, particularly if the local senior political leadership is implicated in TOC. If significant segments of the population depend on TOC for their livelihoods, the legitimacy of the police may be compromised in the short to medium term if activities to counter TOC are successful. The MLT must consider the trade-off between immediate security needs and redefining the economy of the host country.
4.5 Public Order Established

Public order is characterized by the absence of high levels of criminal and political violence, such as kidnapping, murders, riots and the intimidation of targeted groups or individuals. Public disorder is profoundly destabilizing and undercuts efforts to strengthen state security institutions, and is often accompanied by widespread violations of human rights. The judicial system tends to be weak and confidence in its ability to adjudicate cases is low, while prisons are often overflowing. Public order is essential if the population is to gain confidence in the public security system rather than seek security from other entities such as militias and warlords. Maintaining public order is the domain of the police and other law-enforcement agencies, the courts, the prosecution service and prisons, all of which make up the criminal justice system (see Chapter 5).

In some cases, multidimensional UN peace operations have been deployed to support the transition to legitimate government, and even temporarily to assume the legislative and administrate functions—in part or in full—of the state. In such scenarios, maintaining public order is a key function of the peace operation. In most cases however, UNPOL through the FPU, stands ready to assist host-state police in maintaining public order.

4.5.1 Operational activities

The operational activities of a mission supporting the establishment of public order include:

- Establishing a presence in key areas of potential volatility.
- Managing civil disturbances and facilitating peaceful demonstrations.
- Supporting the capacity/capability development of local police and other law-enforcement entities and the re-establishment of the justice system.
- Protecting key governmental and UN installations, cultural sites and infrastructure.
4.5.2 Benchmarks

Short-term
- Assessment on the capacity and capability of security and justice providers is initiated.
- Police and Military components have established coordination mechanisms and are prepared to manage civil disturbances.
- Quick-response elements formed.

Medium-term
- Violence in volatile areas eliminated and if civil disturbances erupt, they are quickly contained.
- Most of the country has returned to normal patterns of daily activity.
- National police and other law-enforcement authorities are present nationwide and are held accountable.
- Population expresses confidence in public order.
- Civil disturbances are quickly contained and actions of security forces are compliant with international human rights.

Long-term
- Rule of law established.
- Evidence of a robust civil society.
- All relevant government bodies and institutions are held accountable.
- Normal civil and political patterns reappear.

4.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination

With the support of the mission and relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders, the host government is responsible for developing its capacity and capability to maintain public order. Until national authorities can fully assume this responsibility, however, the peace operation might be expected to deal with a host of public order issues, in close coordination with national security institutions. OROLSI at UNHQ will be a key player in providing support to the mission in these areas.

Public-order-management tasks, such as crowd and riot control, are a primary function of the host state, and UNPOL, in particular FPUs, often acting in support of the host-state police. In extreme cases when UN
military are located in remote areas and UNPOL is not available, or a public disturbance is being caused by an armed group and the level of violence exceeds the capacity of the police, UN military units may be given a public-order-management role. These units may act alone or in conjunction with the Police component or host-state police. For the Police Commissioner, it will be important to understand the command structure, including the role of the FPU coordinators but also the possibility of integrated command with military assets.

4.5.4 Resources

The mission—and in particular its Military and Police components—should have sufficient training, capacity and capability, as well as the appropriate rules of engagement, to address public-order challenges. The role and deployment of the Police component and the FPUs must be carefully managed through risk analysis as there will be numerous calls on a limited resource.

4.5.5 Challenges and risks

- Local security elements might oppose the peace process.
- Spoiler networks may be entrenched or supported by external means to subvert the rule of law and undermine public order.
- The existence or growth of national and transnational organized crime, including a black market.
- Security and legal systems are corrupt and politicized, and crime is institutionalized and rooted in illicit revenue sources undermining public order.
4.5.6 Considerations

Balancing short-term public order imperatives and investments in broader security sector reform

Perhaps the most critical trade-off faced by the mission will be choosing between an urgent need to address the security situation—possibly by lending legitimacy to less-than-democratic processes and actors, redundant layers of security provision and organizations that have reputations for corruption and lack of professionalism—and establishing legitimacy for patterns of governance and actors that support accountability, transparency and other processes critical to good governance. With limited resources, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements—for example, immediate security versus long-term SSR efforts. While quick wins might build credibility, they can undermine deeper reform of the security sector.

Promoting short-term stability while confronting impunity

Dealing with spoiler groups or individuals may be necessary to secure the engagement of certain factions or mitigate certain tensions. At the same time, ignoring the continued use of political violence or exploitation of criminal networks will preserve a culture of impunity and threaten sustainable peace.

Balancing police and military public order functions

While maintenance of public order is a responsibility of the host-state police force, situations may require UNPOL through its FPUs to act independently or in support of host-state police in order to carry out the mission’s mandate. If the level of violence exceeds that which can be addressed through the capabilities of an FPU, or in cases when such units are not available, the mission’s military component may need to take action. The transition from police to military control of a situation, or vice versa, requires efficient command and coordination procedures. These should be widely understood and frequently rehearsed.
**4.6 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes Implemented**

DDR is a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. The objective of an integrated DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments. Equally, DDR processes can contribute to creating an environment in which peace processes, political and social reconciliation, and access to livelihoods can be enacted, thereby enabling recovery and development towards sustaining peace. Disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants is a highly visible and political process that can increase public confidence in the peace process. It can therefore be seen as integral to consolidating peace and promoting stability.

The UN defines **disarmament** as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of the small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible weapons management programmes.

**Demobilization** is defined as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups. In general, a differentiated approach which takes into account the specific needs of groups such as women, children and people living with disabilities should be adopted.

The first stage of demobilization can extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (e.g. cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage comprises reinsertion—a support package provided to the demobilized. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include the provision of transitional safety allowances, food, clothing, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

**Reintegration** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and an income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame that primarily takes place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, but often necessitates long-term external assistance.
When it comes to DDR processes, the local population, ex-combatants and the host government all have different expectations and agendas, and the peacekeeping mission will always be expected to deliver more than time and capacity allow. The key is to balance what is possible against what the stakeholders believe should be possible within a given time. Public information and community-sensitization campaigns will ensure that affected communities and participating groups receive accurate information on DDR processes. Messages should be designed appropriately for different audiences and employ many different and locally appropriate means of communication.

DDR programmes are viable when certain preconditions exist, such as: (a) a peace agreement and/or a negotiated ceasefire that provides a framework for DDR; (b) trust in the peace process; (c) willingness of the conflict parties to engage in DDR; and (d) a minimum guarantee of security. Increasingly, these conditions are not always present; in those instances, missions can support or pave the way for a fuller DDR programme by employing a number of DDR-related tools (see Box: Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration).

4.6.1 Operational activities

The operational activities undertaken by the mission to support this output include:

• Establishing a strategic framework for UN engagement in DDR.
• Developing an operational plan, including a division of labour, in coordination with UN agencies and national actors.
• Identifying the different categories of persons such as women associated with armed forces or armed groups, children associated with armed forces or armed groups, foreign fighters, and people living with disabilities, to plan and prepare for tailored and specific support.
• Securing funding, particularly for the reintegration phase.
Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Pre-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (pre-DDR) is a local-level transitional stabilization measure designed for those who are eligible for a DDR programme. Pre-DDR can be initiated when the implementation of a DDR programme is delayed.

Transitional weapons and ammunition management

Transitional weapons and ammunition management may include (but is not limited to) weapons collection in exchange for community development projects, and support for the safer management of weapons and ammunition by communities.

Community violence reduction

Community violence reduction is a bottom-up approach that helps to eliminate the main drivers of violence in communities by providing alternatives to recruitment into armed groups and building social cohesion. It includes a wide range of activities from labour-intensive projects to community dialogue forums.

DDR support to mediation

DDR practitioners can provide support to the drafting of DDR provisions in ceasefires and political agreements. They can also make proposals on the design and implementation of DDR programmes, provide advice on how to engage armed forces and groups on DDR issues, and contribute to the attainment of agreements.

DDR support to transitional security arrangements

DDR practitioners can provide support to the establishment of security-related confidence building measures as part of ongoing negotiations, ceasefire or peace agreements. This can include the temporary establishment of legitimate non-state security providers or of mixed patrols and units made up of both state and non-state armed forces and groups.

Source: Integrated DDR Standards
4.6.2 Benchmarks

**Short-term**
- Mechanisms established under civilian lead to maximize national ownership.
- Funding secured to enable execution of the process; technical experts available to provide support; and key sites secured and/or constructed.
- Public information and other outreach programmes conducted.
- Security guarantees coordinated with the host government to provide adequate security.
- Planning for reintegration undertaken.
- Monitoring and evaluation tools developed.

**Medium-term**
- Public order restored.
- Decrease in the number of incidents involving the use of prohibited weapons.
- Programme is supported by the majority of the key factions, communities into which ex-combatants have been reintegrated and the general public.
- Re-recruitment of ex-combatants is prevented, and first-time recruitment of at-risk youth is prevented.
- Traffic and movement of weapons and related materiel are under control.
- Border controls in place to prevent influx of new weapons and materiel.

**Long-term**
- Government has control of national security forces and their use of force.
- Weapons controls enforced in accordance with the rule of law.
- Ex-combatants are largely reintegrated.
- State stockpiles of weapons secured to prevent leakage of weapons into society.
4.6.3 Responsibilities and coordination

Political will among the national parties concerned is an absolute prerequisite for the success of DDR programmes, and the SRSG should actively foster political support for DDR among key stakeholders. The SRSG and MLT should support the programme in accordance with established working mechanisms and in collaboration with the relevant UN and external partners, including key donors. Public information efforts carried out by the mission’s strategic communications and public information department is essential.

Since many local and international implementation partners may be both delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians and provide support for DDR, coordinated planning between humanitarian and DDR programmes is important. DDR occurs in multiple and overlapping planning frameworks. Where peacebuilding and recovery involve a number of national and international stakeholders, the DDR process should be part of national and international recovery strategies. UN Country Teams, the World Bank, the IMF, bilateral donors and national authorities must all be part of the coordination process.

4.6.4 Resources

The mission’s DDR component should include staff with specialized expertise (e.g. planning, monitoring and evaluation, logistics, gender mainstreaming and child protection). Military and police liaison officers should also be seconded to the DDR component. In peacekeeping operations, the military component should be able to contribute to a DDR programme in a number of ways (e.g. through logistical support, provision of security, information gathering and provision of specialized weapons and ammunition management expertise). Full engagement by the Mission Support section in DDR programmes is also essential.

Some partners’ ability to assist may be limited by their mandate. Many humanitarian and development organizations, for instance, cannot work with combatants until they have been demobilized. Careful consideration should be given to how best to make use of such partners’ assistance while respecting their mandates or other factors that may limit their work.

In a peacekeeping context, funding from peacekeeping assessed contributions can be used to cover disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion) operations, while voluntary contributions from donors cover reintegration activities. This diversity of funding sources has at times resulted in a gap between disarmament and demobilization—both relatively easy to fund, plan and implement—and
reintegration, which is dependent on willingness of donors and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a timely manner in a post-conflict environment. This gap can be minimized through DDR-related programmatic activities (e.g. community violence-reduction projects), and by ensuring long-term reintegration programmes are properly planned with donors, and adequately resourced from the outset.

The inclusion of reinsertion funding as a part of demobilization allows assessed contributions to be used to provide participants with transitional assistance for a period of up to one year. The goal of ensuring that warring factions can return to civilian life may require direct assistance for demobilized combatants as well as local communities.

4.6.5 Challenges and risks

- Lack of political will and/or host government does not accept ownership of the programme.
- Lack of comprehensive peace agreement/political settlement; not all armed groups are party to the peace agreement.
- Relationship with the host government on the issue of child soldiers may need to be managed carefully, particularly if state security forces include children.
- Girls may be recruited by armed forces for combat or support roles; their gender and place in society mean they are vulnerable to consequences such as rape, sexual violence, pregnancy and stigma that may be overlooked in demobilization efforts.
- Military and police components, which may be authorized to use force, may not have clear guidance or training on what to do when engaging with child soldiers using lethal force.
- Combatants do not sign up to DDR.
- National actors/local communities have limited capacity to support reintegration.
- DDR benefits are perceived as inequitable.
- Disarmed and demobilized factions possess inadequate skills for reintegration, and there is inadequate funding for reintegration.
- Supply of arms and related materiel cannot be controlled.
- Security of demobilized belligerents and their families cannot be guaranteed, and reinsertion programmes appear to reward ex-combatants in preference to their victims.
4.6.6 Considerations

Providing credible security guarantees at the expense of other mission mandate priorities

The provision of credible security guarantees is essential if combatants are to give up their weapons. The peacekeeping force should have the capacity to provide security throughout all phases of DDR, not least at cantonment sites as well as the home communities of demobilized combatants, while paying close attention to the balance of power among factions. This must be balanced against the other demands on the mission’s security resources, such as POC.

International support can lend credibility to these efforts by overseeing disarmament and demobilization or participating in a national oversight commission to ensure that disarmament rates among rivals are comparable. This support should also ensure that disarmament violations are investigated and corrected.

Complete or conditional disarmament

Complete disarmament may not be immediately acceptable to all parties. Ideally, the extent of disarmament should have been addressed during the drafting of the relevant agreements. A broad range of short- and long-term activities should accompany this process, such as community-based weapons collection and control programmes, weapons destruction, the re-establishment of domestic legal systems to control and regulate the possession, production and supply of weapons, and securing stockpiles to prevent the leakage of arms into society.

Balancing accountability and stability

Coordination and sequencing of transitional justice and DDR programmes begins with an understanding of how the two processes can interact positively in the short term in ways that, at a minimum, do not hinder their respective objectives of accountability and stability.
Reintegration and local capacity

While international actors and donors often show great enthusiasm for disarmament and demobilization programmes, their commitment to the long and costly reintegration process may be less certain or too hesitant. Shortages of resources have frequently hampered reintegration efforts in the past. Successful reintegration requires the prompt and sustained commitment of financial and technical assistance over many years.

Another reintegration challenge involves preparing and convincing host communities to accept ex-combatants into their neighbourhoods. In particular, programmes should avoid displacing women who may have assumed head-of-household responsibilities during the conflict.

Inclusive or exclusive treatment

While ex-combatants may need special attention to prevent them from becoming a destabilizing factor, paying exclusive attention to them risks generating resentment in the broader population. Other groups, such as refugees, IDPs, women and children, require substantial social and economic support.

Security should be balanced with equity. As far as possible, strategies for ex-combatants should be integrated with broader strategies to address resettlement and rehabilitation for displaced populations, reconciliation efforts, the rule of law and governance issues. This will also help prevent ex-combatants being stigmatized or isolated from the rest of the community. The peacekeeping mission runs the risk of losing its impartiality if this task is not performed carefully.

Balancing rapid disarmament and a long-term approach

The long-term approach required of DDR is sometimes offset by the short-term political or security imperative to rapidly disarm combatants that pose an immediate threat to peace. If disarmament is rushed and not planned carefully, it could have serious negative consequences at a later stage, especially if reintegration is not well planned and resourced.
Demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in the state security sector

This may be a sensitive topic with the host government. In many conflict and post-conflict contexts, children may have been forcibly recruited to serve in the national armed forces. Similarly, other armed groups are likely to rely on children. While the peacekeeping mission has a responsibility to report any grave violations, it will need to consider whether, and if so how, it engages with the state security sector where these violations are taking place.