Separating parties to a conflict allows peacekeeping force to monitor their actions. Establishing areas of control in the short term helps limit civilian suffering. It also asserts control over armed forces in support of ceasefires. This helps build confidence in a fragile peace process.

What does it mean to separate warring parties?

Separating forces involves creating distinct areas of control. It can also involve observation and monitoring of a ceasefire. This reduces tensions and allows other aspects of a peace process to proceed.

Preventing large-scale fighting demonstrates the authority and forcefulness of the mission. It also generates credibility. This sets the tone for future actions and compliance by the parties.

The nature of the conflict will determine the type of separation required. In interstate or secessionist intra-state conflicts, buffer zones may be used. Conflicts where combatants and civilians mix may call for zones of separation. These create a neutral space or “no-man’s land”.

Whatever the type of separation, the parties need to agree on boundaries and entry points. They must be well marked, and identifiable on a map or formal record.

Separation of warring parties usually involves military action. But in the final analysis one thing is important to remember. Ending armed conflict and securing peace depends on political – not military – solutions.

The HoM must play a key role in keeping all belligerents engaged in the peace process. The FC monitors compliance with security arrangements under the mission’s mandate.

Civilians are often targeted during armed conflict. Women, children, refugees, IDPs, minorities and the elderly are most vulnerable. Mission leaders must protect these groups using integrated and holistic mission responses. This prevents suffering and strengthens confidence in the peace process.

What is the protection of civilians?

Most contemporary peace operations include a protection of civilians (POC) mandate. POC refers to “all necessary action” to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians. This can even involve the use of deadly force. A mission’s actions should not undermine a host government’s responsibility to protect civilians.

“All necessary action” can also include political, developmental, humanitarian or other non-violent means. These may be necessary to ensure civilian protection in the long term. Countering threats thus requires an all-of-mission approach.

Mission leaders should frame protection activities within a sound political process. This goes well beyond physical security. It calls for a comprehensive approach involving all mission components and external actors.

Protection efforts should include multiple components of the peace operation besides uniformed personnel (e.g. Political Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information and Civil Affairs). Coordination mechanisms such as the JOC and JMAC may also play a role.

If a peace operation has a POC mandate, it should have the training and capacity required to carry out the task. If the mission faces gaps in these resources, the MLT should inform UNHQ and the Security Council.

The three tiers of protection of civilians

Missions should support the three tiers of POC. This requires a regular assessment of the operating environment, its actors and dynamics.

The free flow of people and goods leads to the normalisation of daily life and economic growth. But various factors can affect a mission’s freedom of movement. Examples include hostilities, opposing factions and natural disasters. It is up to the various mission components to manage these factors.

What is freedom of movement?

Freedom of movement is the free flow of people and goods without fear of physical harm or disruption. But it can also mean cutting off illicit commodity flows. Free movement encourages normal daily life, such as access to schools and markets. In addition, it increases the social integration of isolated communities.

Hostilities between warring factions can reduce freedom of movement of the civilian population and the mission.

Other factors may influence the free flow of people and goods. One example is when one or more parties uses IEDs. Responding to threats of explosive ordnance and IEDs is a military–technical issue. It is therefore a key focus of EOD activities. A natural disaster could also end up restricting freedom of movement.

Even a host state conscious of asserting its sovereignty can influence free movement. Although casualties would be unlikely, an uncooperative host state could make movement difficult. This goes for both civilians and the mission.

The MLT and the host government must therefore set the rules on where to enable, limit or deny access.

The Military component oversees operational and tactical mobility. This means making sure that all personnel across the mission area have free movement. The host government guarantees freedom of movement for the population and the mission.

The SRSG will need to urge and remind all parties to adhere to their agreements. The mission needs to track the state of freedom of movement through the JOC and the Force HQ. Meanwhile, the FC and the Police Commissioner need to ensure compliance on the ground.

Other components have important roles to play regarding freedom of movement. One example is military and civilian components involved in mine action. Another is UNHCR and other UN agencies dealing with the movement of refugees and IDPs. Coordination is thus essential, as is close political engagement with the parties.

Threats to the peace process come from many sources. This output focuses on the challenges posed by spoilers. A mission should base its management of spoilers on a peace and conflict analysis. It may also be important to integrate intelligence and law-enforcement resources.

Defining spoilers

Spoilers work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. They may be agents, organizations or factions. Spoilers can use both non-violent and violent means to achieve their objectives. A peace process may threaten their world view, power or financial interests.

Spoilers can be domestic or international. They might also be violent extremists, organized and unorganized criminals, or warring factions.

Mission leaders must identify spoilers’ intentions, motivations, levels of commitment and interactions. They also need to understand spoilers’ political, social and financial strategies. Their networks, and their leadership and organizational structures, are also relevant. SSR and DDR are central elements in dealing with spoiler challenges.

It is the responsibility of the host government to address spoilers. But it may need to do so with the mission’s support, in the early stages at least. OROLSI will be a key player in providing support to the mission. Relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders may also play a role.

Mission leaders should encourage close cooperation between the various mission components. This is especially true of components with situational-awareness and analytical capabilities. Examples include the JOC, JMAC, UNPOL’s criminal intelligence cell, and U2 branch. Where appropriate, the MLT should also share information with regional partners.

Distinguishing between spoilers

We can define spoilers according to three factors. First, their relationship to the peace process. Second, their willingness to negotiate. And third, their willingness to use violence.

Relationship to the peace process

Relationship to the peace process

Spoilers can be inside or outside of the peace process. Inside spoilers can be part of the host government. They may also be a party to an agreement that has failed to abide by that agreement. Outside spoilers have not signed up or agreed to the peace process. They might use any means to prevent the process from succeeding.

Willingness to negotiate

Other spoilers may have limited goals. For example, they may seek power sharing, or to redress grievances. Such spoilers are willing to negotiate to achieve these goals in the context of a peace process. A peace process may thus need adjustments to accommodate their goals.

Willingness to use violence

Some spoilers may not be willing to negotiate. For example, their goals may be ideological or religious. They may also have had their criminal enterprises put at risk. This type of spoiler is more likely to use force than other types. Mission leaders should consider this when designing operational approaches (including counter-terrorism activities). UN missions need to be able to protect themselves and their staff from terrorist activity.

Operational approaches

The mission’s operational approach must address each type of spoiler. It should reflect the context in which spoilers operate. The connections that empower them are also worth considering.

MLTs, through the JMAC, must find ‘nodes’ where criminality, extremism and politics intersect. This requires integrating intelligence, law-enforcement, political, diplomatic and development resources. They will also need to support credible local institutions.

The basic concept is to combine proactive, reactive and consequence-management measures.

• Proactive measures are positive actions to engage with spoilers and address their goals.
• Reactive measures use mission assets and national structures to weaken spoilers.
• Consequence-management measures address the consequences of extreme spoiler acts.

Taken together, these measures undermine incentives for violence while promoting alternative paths.

Mitigating the impact of transnational organized crime

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is more than a law-enforcement problem. It can threaten general security and state legitimacy (through corruption). TOC groups acting in the mission area risk derailing the mission and the peace process. Actors engaged in TOC may even be part of the host government.

In the past, many mission leaders chose to ignore TOC, at least in the initial stages of the mission. But delayed action sometimes made it difficult to counter the negative impact of TOC. The MLT should consider preventive measures early on to mitigate TOC’s effects.

Public disorder is destabilizing. It undercuts efforts to strengthen state security institutions. It is often accompanied by widespread violations of human rights. Public order is thus a prerequisite for confidence in the public security system. Without it, the population may seek security from illegitimate entities such as militias and warlords.

What is public order?

In a state of public disorder, the judicial system tends to be weak. Confidence in its ability to adjudicate cases is low, and prisons are overflowing.

In contrast, public order usually involves low levels of criminal and political violence. This means fewer kidnappings, murders, riots and intimidation of targeted groups or individuals.

The host government must develop its own capacity to maintain public order. Maintaining public order is then the domain of the police and the criminal justice system. The latter includes courts, prosecution service and prisons.

UN peace operations are sometimes asked to support a transition to legitimate government. In some cases, this requires the mission to maintain public order. But in most cases, UNPOL (through the FPU) assists the host-state police. OROLSI at UNHQ is another key player in providing support to the mission.

In extreme cases, UN military units may play a public-order-management role. For instance, UN military may operate in remote areas where UNPOL is not available. Or an armed group may cause a public disturbance, and the level of violence exceeds the capacity of the police.

Supporting the host government in restoring public order is a whole-of-mission task. However, the police component takes the tactical lead.

The mission should have enough training, capacity and capability to address public-order challenges. This is particularly relevant for its Military and Police components. They will also need appropriate rules of engagement.

Dealing with combatants is a crucial first step towards peace and reconciliation. DDR contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict environment. Ex-combatants, local population and the host government will have their own expectations of DDR. They will expect peacekeeping missions to deliver more than time and capacity allow. The key is to balance what is possible against what stakeholders believe is possible in a given time.

What is DDR?

DDR supports armed forces and groups to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. An integrated DDR process contributes to security and stability in post-conflict environments.

DDR processes provide space for ongoing peace processes. Political and social reconciliation, and access to livelihoods, can continue. In essence, DDR enables recovery and development towards sustaining peace.

Disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants is a very visible and political process. It can increase public confidence in the peace process.

All stakeholders will have their own expectations of DDR. This includes the local population, ex-combatants and the host government. The key is to balance what is possible against what stakeholders believe is possible in a given time. Appropriate public information and community-sensitization campaigns play an important role in this.

DDR programmes are most likely to work when:’

• a peace agreement and/or a negotiated ceasefire provides a framework for DDR;
• there is trust in the peace process;
• conflict parties are willing to engage in DDR; and
• there is a minimum guarantee of security.

But these conditions are not always present. In their absence, missions can support or pave the way for a DDR programme using DDR-related tools (see Box: Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration).

Political will among national parties is a prerequisite for successful DDR programmes. The SRSG should therefore foster political support for DDR among key stakeholders.

The SRSG and MLT should support DDR through established working mechanisms. This should happen in collaboration with relevant UN and external partners and donors.

Some partners may have limited mandates. Many humanitarian organizations, for instance, can only work with demobilized combatants.

Diversity of funding sources sometimes creates a gap between the three stages of DDR. Disarmament and demobilization are easier to put in place than reintegration. A mission could reduce this gap through, for example, community violence-reduction projects. It could also plan and resource long-term reintegration programmes with donors.

Tools related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Pre-DDR
A local-level transitional stabilization measure. Used when a DDR programme faces delays.

Transitional weapons and ammunition management
This may include weapons collection in exchange for community development projects. It may also involve support for safer community management of weapons and ammunition.

Community violence reduction
A bottom-up approach that reduces the main drivers of violence in communities. It involves providing alternatives to recruitment into armed groups and building social cohesion.

DDR support to mediation
DDR practitioners can support drafting of DDR provisions in ceasefires and political agreements. They can also make proposals on the design and implementation of DDR programmes.

DDR support to transitional security arrangements
DDR practitioners can also support security-related confidence building measures. Examples include units made up of both state and non-state armed forces and groups.

Source: Integrated DDR Standards